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I. Introduction
Professor Jenia lontcheva Turner has written that "[a]
perception exists, perhaps fueled by the politicized nature of the
recent high-profile trials of Saddam Hussein and Slobodan
Milogevid, that international criminal trials are essentially political
events cloaked as judicial proceedings."' Professor Hayden has
accused the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) of being a scam designed to punish those that
the United States viewed as its enemies.2 Professor Mandel has
described the ICTY as a "hoax,"3 and anti-ICTY sentiment is
prevalent in Serbia. Surveys conducted throughout the 2000s
suggested that somewhere between 80-90% of ethnic Serbs
thought the ICTY was biased and untrustworthy.4 Ethnic Croats
are similarly suspicious of the court and a significant minority
believes the court is fundamentally unjust.' In 2005, Carla Del
I Jenia lontcheva Turner, Defense Perspectives on Law and Politics in
International Criminal Trials, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 529, 531 (2008); see also id. at 576-77;
Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF
UNITED NATIONS LAW 1, 1 (2002) (noting that Milogevid's trial risked "becoming a show
trial"); Jeremy Peterson, Note, Unpacking Show Trials: Situating the Trial of Saddam
Hussein, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 257, 259-60 (2007) (collecting sources referring to Saddam
Hussein's trial as a show trial); see infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (collecting
sources referring to ICTY trials as show trials).
2 See R. Hayden, Biased "Justice ": Humanrightsism and the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 549, 551-52 (1999)
("[P]ut bluntly, the [ICTY] prosecutes only those whom the Americans want prosecuted,
and the United States government threatens prosecution by the supposedly independent
ICTY in order to obtain compliance from political actors in the Balkans.").
3 See Michael Mandel, NATO's Bombing of Kosovo Under International Law
Politics and Human Rights in International Criminal Law, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 95, 95
(2001) (describing the ICTY as a "hoax" because of its failure to indict members of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for their intervention in Kosovo).
4 Stuart Ford, A Social Psychology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy of
International Criminal Courts: Implications for the Success of Transitional Justice
Mechanisms, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 405, 416 (2012); see also Mirko Klarin, The
Impact of the ICTY Trials on Public Opinion in the Former Yugoslavia, 7 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 89, 92 (2009) (indicating that only 7% of Serbian citizens in a 2007 survey thought
that the ICTY was unbiased).
5 See Janine Natalya Clark, The ICTY and Reconciliation in Croatia: A Case
Study of Vukovar, 10 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 397, 405-09 (2012); see also id. at 407 (noting
that many ethnic Croats who had fought in the conflict maintained that the ICTY was
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Ponte, the chief prosecutor of the ICTY, was forced to
acknowledge that "[t]he debate on war crimes in the former
Yugoslavia is not subsiding. It is present in the daily life and
media, and always politicised.... [T]he public is only
interested ... in politically, not judicially, defined truth."6
Even some of the participants question the court's motives. A
small number of defense attorneys at the ICTY view the entire
process as fundamentally political in nature,' and a much larger
proportion of them think that particular practices at the ICTY are
unfair, even if the whole enterprise is not just a "show trial."'
There also have been academic criticisms of the fairness of the
proceedings, although academics have generally not concluded
that the trials are shams.' On the other hand, many maintain that
the ICTY has been fundamentally fair, impartial, and just.o
The question of whether ICTY trials are legal or political has
recently returned to the spotlight with a controversial series of
decisions. On November 16, 2012, the Appeals Chamber
acquitted and released Ante Gotovina and Mladen Marka6,
overturning convictions against both accused." Gotovina had
unjust).
6 Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Address of the Prosecutor at the
Inauguration of the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of BH, U.N. Press Release
CDP/P.I.S./944 (Mar. 9, 2005), http://www.icty.org/sid/8633/en (emphasis omitted).
7 See Turner, supra note 1, at 591 (discussing the views of the few defense
attorneys who believed the trials were primarily political events).
8 See id. at 550, 560-66 (explaining that a majority of defense attorneys have
expressed concerns regarding certain ICTY practices, such as the expansive use and lack
of clarity in indictments that charge joint criminal enterprise).
9 See James Meernik, Justice and Peace?: How the International Criminal
Tribunal Affects Societal Peace in Bosnia, 42 J. PEACE RES. 271, 277-78 (2005)
(discussing academic criticisms of the ICTY). But see supra notes 2-3.
10 See Jane E. Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities after Conflict:
What Impact on Building the Rule of Law?, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 251, 319-20 (2007) ("The
ICTY ... [has] accomplished a great deal in terms of bringing to justice, in fair legal
proceedings, individuals accused of major atrocities."); Patricia M. Wald, ICTY Judicial
Proceedings: An Appraisal from Within, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 466, 466 (2004) ("I
believe it would be almost impossible to find an impartial commentator in 2003 in
Europe, Africa, Asia or the United States who would contend that ICTY trials are not
fair and in accordance with internationally accepted criminal-law [sic] standards.").
11 See Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Marka6, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Judgment (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
gotovinalacjug/en/l 2111 6judgement.pdf.
2013 47
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
been a general in the Croatian army, and Marka6 had been
Assistant Minister of the Interior for Croatia.12 Both were alleged
to have been part of a criminal plan to permanently remove the
Serbian civilian population from a region in Croatia called
Krajina.' The release of Gotovina and Markai was treated by
Serbian politicians as evidence that the ICTY's trials are
political. 14
Then, less than two weeks later, one of the Trial Chambers
acquitted Ramush Haradinaj, the former Prime Minister of
Kosovo." Haradinaj and his co-accused were alleged to have been
responsible for the mistreatment of ethnic Serbs at the hands of the
Kosovo Liberation Army.16 Their acquittal was treated by ethnic
Serbs as further evidence that ICTY trials are political." In short,
the question of the nature of ICTY trials is as salient today as it
was in the late 1990s. As a result, the principal goal of this Article
is to use evidence from ICTY indictments to draw some
conclusions about the nature of the trials and the process as a
whole.
After twenty years in operation, most of the ICTY's cases have
been completed, and the ICTY itself is beginning to wind down.
12 Id. It 3-4.
'3 Id
14 See Marko Milanovic, The Gotovina Omnishambles, BLOG OF THE EUROPEAN J.
OF INT'L L. (Nov. 18, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-gotovina-omnishambles/#more-
6975 ("In Serbia, the judgment only confirms the perpetual victim narrative[:] the ICTY
and the international community never really cared about crimes against Serbs, and the
Tribunal has shown itself to be nothing more than a political court."); see also Hague
War Court Acquits Croat Generals Gotovina and Markac, BBC NEwS EUROPE, Nov. 16,
2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20352187; Marlise Simons, Hague
Court Overturns Convictions of 2 Croatian Generals Over a 1995 Offensive, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ll/17/world/
europe/hague-court-overturns-convictions-of-2-croatian-generals.html?_r-0.
15 See Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj et al., Public Judgment with Confidential
Annex, Case No. IT-04-84bis-T (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj
/tjug/en/I 21129judgement-en.pdf.
16 Id. l.
17 See Marlise Simons, War Crimes Court Frees Former Leader of Kosovo, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/30/world/europe/un-court-
frees-former-leader-of-kosovo.html?rt-0 ("Inevitably, the acquittals have provoked
criticism beyond Serbia that the verdicts were politically inspired, because the militaries
were backed by the West.").
18 As recently as two years ago, the ICTY was predicting that it would complete its
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While there were some attempts to study the ICTY empirically
during its early years," the field has expanded rapidly as the court
nears its end.20 Most authors, however, have focused on ICTY
judgments. This Article seeks to fill a gap in the literature by
analyzing the contents of the indictments. Unless otherwise
stated, all the data presented is drawn from a database 21 created by
the author that contains information on indictments and sentences
or acquittals issued up until May 3, 2012.22 More information
about the database is contained in the Appendix.2 3
The analysis of the indictments indicates that ICTY trials have
not been show trials. There are no strong correlations between the
allegations in the indictments and either conviction or the resulting
sentence length. One factor, a charge of genocide, does have a
moderate correlation with sentence length, but that is best
explained by the longer sentences that generally result from
genocide convictions. Moreover, conviction rates at the ICTY are
generally lower than equivalent rates in domestic criminal justice
systems. In short, there is little evidence that the allegations in the
work in 2014. See Stuart Ford, How Leadership in International Criminal Law is
Shifting from the United States to Europe and Asia: An Analysis of Spending on and
Contributions to International Criminal Courts, 55 ST. Louis U. L.J. 953, 989 n.158
(2011). In its most recent Completion Strategy, the ICTY predicts the appeals may not
be completed until 2017. See Letter from the President of the International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, to
the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. No. S/2013/308, Annex I 51 (May 12,
2013) (noting that appeals, if any, in the Prlid et al. case would be unlikely to be
completed until mid-2017).
19 See, e.g., James Meernik, Victor's Justice or the Law?: Judging and Punishing
at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 47 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 140 (2003) (assessing whether the ICTY's trials are fair using data from early
cases).
20 See Barbora Hold et al., International Sentencing Facts and Figures, 9 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 411, 413 n.5 (2011) (listing other articles that have empirically studied
ICTY convictions and sentences).
21 ICTY Trial Dataset (May 03, 2012) (on file with author).
22 This means that all of the indictments that have been issued by the ICTY were
coded as available by the cut-off date. Not all of the outcomes were included, however.
On the date that data collection was completed, the trials of eight individuals were either
underway or about to begin. The database does not contain information on the outcomes
of those trials.
23 See infra Appendix: The Database.
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indictments effectively control the outcomes of the trials.
There are, however, some problems with the indictments. For
example, in a small number of indictments, it is hard to tell
whether the accused is alleged to have caused unlawful deaths or
whether the discussion of unlawful deaths is intended simply as
background information. This is problematic, although it occurs
relatively infrequently. Another concern relates to the use of
certain modes of liability. Aiding and abetting, planning, and
instigating appear to have been alleged somewhat indiscriminately
by the prosecution. On the other hand, the modes of liability that
are most often criticized, superior responsibility and joint criminal
enterprise, do not appear to have been used indiscriminately or
functioned as forms of strict liability.
An area that looks troubling at first glance is the ethnic
composition of the accused and their sentences. More ethnic
Serbs were charged than any other ethnic group, and Serbs
received sentences that were significantly longer than those
received by ethnic Bosniaks.2 4 Certainly, many ethnic Serbs take
this disparity as evidence of bias and unfairness by the court.25
However, an assumption of equivalence amongst the accused is
not warranted.26 The ethnic distribution of the charges and the
sentences is consistent with Serbs having committed the most
crimes and the most serious crimes; the evidence suggests that this
latter explanation is the better one.27 Ultimately, one of this
24 For purposes of this Article, the term "Bosniak" refers to those people who
identify themselves as either Bosniak or Bosnian Muslim. Although the term "Bosnian
Muslim" is often used both by the ICTY and in the writings of academics, not all of
those who fall into the group are followers of Islam. Accordingly, this Article will refer
to such people as Bosniak or ethnically Bosniak. See Prosecutor v. Naletilic &
Martinovic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, 1 n.2 (Int'l Crim. Trib. For the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/naletilicmartinovic/tjug/en/nal-
tj030331-e.pdf (noting that "not all persons included in this group[, Bosnian Muslims,]
may have Islamic faith."); Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and
Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution ofJustice to Reconciliation, 24 HuM. RTS. Q.
573, 588 n.48 (2002) ("The three largest national groups in Bosnia are Bosnia Croats
(Roman Catholic), Bosnian Serbs (Orthodox), and Bosnia Muslims.. . . [T]he Bosnian
Muslim community self-identified their national origin as 'Bosniak,' to emphasize the
cultural and de-emphasize the religious character of their community.").
25 See Klarin, supra note 4, at 92.
26 See infra Section III.C.
27 See id.
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Article's central findings is that the trials appear to have been
fundamentally fair and thus predominantly legal, even if some
political goals were pursued.
If one looks beyond the trials, however, some problems exist.
Most importantly, the Prosecutor appears to have been influenced
by political considerations in deciding whom to charge and whom
not to charge. There is evidence that the Prosecutor was
successfully pressured not to open investigations into the actions
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) militaries
following NATO's intervention in Kosovo. In addition, political
pressures appear to have led to the initiation of weak cases against
ethnic Bosniaks and Kosovar Albanians, with the result that they
were convicted at significantly lower rates than ethnic Serbs or
Croats. Thus, there is evidence that political considerations have
affected the Prosecutor's charging decisions in ways that call into
question the Prosecutor's independence, judgment, and
compliance with prosecutorial standards.
Section II discusses some of the concepts used in this Article,
including what it means to be a show trial, a political trial, or a
legal trial. Section III discusses the demographics of the indictees,
including their sex, age, ethnicity, role, and seniority within their
respective political and military organizations. The content of the
indictments, including the charges against the accused, the modes
of liability alleged, and the scope and gravity of the crimes is
addressed in Section IV. The disposition of the cases, including
guilt or acquittal, the sentences, and the role of guilty pleas, is
discussed in Section V. Section VI summarizes the Article's
conclusions. The Appendix contains information on how the
database used in this Article was created.
II. Of Show Trials, Political Trials, and Legal Trials
A. Show Trials
One term that has often been used in connection with the
ICTY is "show trial." It has been used frequently by academics,2 8
28 See Koskenniemi, supra note 1, at I (arguing that the Milogevi6 trial runs the
risk "of becoming a show trial"); Michael P. Scharf, The Legacy of the Milosevic Trial,
37 NEw. ENGL. L. REv. 915, 915 (2003) (asking whether "history [will] remember
Milotevid as a victim of victor's justice, a scapegoat tried in a show trial before a one-
sided court"); Peterson, supra note 1, at 272 (suggesting that "Milogevid's trial probably
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and a search on Westlaw of newspaper articles about the
Milogevid trial has revealed 245 articles containing the phrase
"show trial." 29  But what is a show trial? According to Professor
Turner, a show trial is one that "simply provides the appearance of
a legal proceeding before inevitable conviction. . . ."30 The term
has its origins in the trials conducted in Moscow in the late 1930s
by the prosecutor Andrei Vyshinsky. 31 These public trials had the
trappings of legality, but the reality was that the accused were
coerced into providing confessions; the trials were a sham with
conviction being the only possible result.3 2 As a result, the most
common way to use the phrase today is to describe proceedings
where the accused's guilt is assured and the trial itself is for
show.33
This definition has two components. First, the trial must be
could have been made less of a show trial had he been forced to accept counsel"); David
Sloss, Hard-Nosed Realism and U.S. Human Rights Policy, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 431,
437-38 (2002) (suggesting that selective trials of low-level perpetrators risked turning
the ICTY trials into show trials); Jos6 E. Alvarez, Crimes of State/Crimes of Hate:
Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 445 n.400 (1999) (noting that Serbians
branded the ICTY trials as show trials attempting to undermine the Serbian nationalist
cause). See generally Turner, supra note 1 (exploring whether the ICTY engages in
show trials).
29 The search was conducted on January 11, 2013, in the Westlaw database
"allnews". The exact search was for ("'milosevic' /p 'show trial"').
30 Turner, supra note 1, at 534.
31 See Peterson, supra note 1, at 263; Awol K. Allo, The 'Show' in Show Trial:
Contextualizing the Politicization of the Courtroom, 15 BARRY L. REV. 41, 43 (2010).
32 See generally Robert Conquest, THE GREAT TERROR: A REASSESSMENT (1990
Oxford University Press) (describing Stalin's "Great Purge" of the 1930s, a campaign of
political oppression, and detailing Soviet leaders' use of torture to coerce the accused to
confess publically to imaginary crimes). See also Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Soviet Criminal
Justice and the Great Terror, 46 SLAVIC REV. 391 (1987); Allo, supra note 31, at 52-54.
33 See Peterson, supra note 1, at 260 ("A quick review of the literature turns up an
abundance of uses of the term 'show trial' to describe trials involving certain or near-
certain conviction of defendants."); Show Trial Definition, OED.com, available at
Oxford English Dictionary (last visited Sept. 1, 2013) (noting that show trial is "usu[ally]
used with specific reference to a prejudged trial of political dissidents by a Communist
government"); Koskenniemi, supra note 1, at 18 ("A trial that 'automatically' vindicates
the position of the Prosecutor is a show trial in the precise Stalinist sense of that
expression."). Not everyone agrees that this is the best way to define show trial. See
generally Peterson, supra note 1 (arguing that trials that have only minor deviations from
norms of fairness can also be considered show trials if they also have some public or
educative function).
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public, for a trial conducted in secrecy cannot be a show trial.3 4
Second, conviction must be either certain or nearly certain, such
that the trial itself is simply a show.35 Defined this way, show
trials are always undesirable because they contravene fundamental
rules of fairness. 36
All of the ICTY's trials have been public; therefore they all
meet the first element of being a show trial, although this tells us
relatively little. Put another way, lots of trials are public, but few
of them are show trials. Thus, the second criterion does far more
work in narrowing down that class of cases that meet the
definition of a show trial.
How do we decide whether the outcomes of ICTY trials are
assured? There are two possible models for show trials. In the
Stalinist model," there is a mastermind telling the judges how to
vote on particular issues. This mastermind directly controls the
outcome of the cases. The other model for a show trial does not
need a mastermind. Rather, if the procedural and evidentiary rules
favor the prosecution too heavily, or the judges are simply too
deferential to the theories and evidence presented by the
prosecution, one could have a trial where conviction was
effectively assured. This would be a "structural" show trial
because it is the structure of the proceeding that assures
conviction, rather than direct control over the judges. The U.S.
military commissions at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba (at least as they
were originally envisioned), might be structural show trials, given
concerns that the rules and procedures were slanted in favor of the
Prosecutor so as to ensure convictions.3 8
The author is unaware of anybody who has seriously argued
34 See Peterson, supra note 1, at 263 ("Consider an entirely rigged trial kept
completely secret. Such a trial is not an attempt to teach a lesson. It involves no 'show'
at all.").
35 See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
36 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(2) (stating that
those accused of a crime are entitled to a presumption of innocence); see also Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, art. 11(1).
37 See Koskenniemi, supra note 1, at 18 (describing the Stalinist model as a trial
"that 'automatically' vindicates the position of the Prosecutor").
38 See, e.g., Mary Cheh, Should Lawyers Participate in Rigged Systems? The Case
of the Military Commissions, I J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 375 (2005) (describing the
allegedly biased process of U.S. military commissions at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba).
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ICTY trials were show trials in the Stalinist sense, with a behind
the scenes mastermind directing the judges to enter particular
verdicts in particular cases. Moreover, it would be hard to take
such claims seriously. The ICTY has employed thousands of
people from all over the world over the course of more than
twenty years of operations. The judges alone have come from
forty-nine different countries and include judges from North
America, South America, Europe, Africa, and Asia.39 Among
them have been some of the world's preeminent judges, including
figures like Patricia Wald, Theodor Meron, Antonio Cassese,
Fausto Pocar, and Mohamed Shahabuddeen. It is hard to imagine
that these judges all agreed to blindly follow the directions of a
behind-the-scenes mastermind. It is even harder to believe that
such a plan could have remained secret over the last twenty years.
If ICTY trials were show trials, they were structural show trials,
not Stalinist ones.
If one eliminates the possibility of Stalinist show trials, then it
becomes possible to test for the presence of structural show trials.
If the ICTY was conducting structural show trials, one would
expect the outcomes of the trials to match closely with the
indictments because the judgments would largely rubber-stamp the
prosecution's allegations. In fair trials, on the other hand, one
would expect the evidence presented at trial to determine the
result, and one would not expect the prosecution to win on every
single disputed issue. One would expect the accused to succeed
(i.e., create a reasonable doubt) with respect to at least some parts
of the indictments most of the time, resulting in a partial acquittal,
and secure complete acquittals some of the time. Of course, even
when the outcome is decided by the evidence presented at trial,
one would expect similarities between the indictments and the
outcomes, because conviction rates for those accused of violent
crimes generally exceed 90%.40
Thus, this Article will look for statistically significant
correlations4 1 between the components of the indictments and the
39 See Current Permanent Judges, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/sid/151 (last visited Sept. 11, 2013); see also
Former Permanent Judges, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/sid/10572 (last visited Sept. 11, 2013).
40 See infra notes 187-197 and accompanying text.
41 See infra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing correlations and explaining
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results of the trials. If the outcomes are driven exclusively or
almost exclusively by the contents of the indictments, then there
should be strong correlations between certain aspects of the
indictments and the outcomes. For example, one might expect that
charging an individual with more counts, with crimes committed
at more locations, or with having killed more people would result
in longer sentences or a higher rate of conviction at a structural
show trial. Such correlations, if they existed, would be evidence
that the deck was stacked too heavily in favor of the prosecution
and that the trials were structural show trials.
On the other hand, if the hypothesized correlations do not
exist, then this suggests that the results are being driven by the
evidence presented at trial and not by the contents of the
indictments.4 2 Of course, in a strict sense, proving that the
indictments do not control the outcomes is not the same as proving
that the evidence presented at trial does. But as a practical matter,
if the trials are not show trials, then it is more likely that they are
being driven by the evidence, because there are few competing
hypotheses to explain the outcomes if one rules out both show
trials and evidence-based trials.
B. Political vs. Legal Trials
While it is important to know whether ICTY trials are show
trials, demonstrating that they are not show trials fails to show that
they are "good," 'just," or "fair." Thus, this Article will look at
other ways to evaluate the nature of the trials. Professor Turner
suggests that one way of viewing ICTY trials is to situate them on
a continuum that runs from the "legal" to the "political." A purely
legal trial would be one where the trial would be "limited to the
determination of guilt and the assessment of blame through fair
how they are used in this Article).
42 If the ICTY trials were show trials in the Stalinist sense, then the mastermind
might permit the defendants to win some points and even permit the occasional acquittal
so as to preserve the appearance of fairness. As a consequence, the absence of
correlations between indictments and judgments might demonstrate only the deviousness
and foresight of the mastermind. This may be true, but there is no evidence that ICTY
trials are show trials in the Stalinist sense. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
Therefore, this argument does not undermine the use of correlations to test whether
ICTY trials are structural show trials.
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procedures."43 Hannah Arendt, famously and controversially,
argued that this was the only role that courts should play in her
commentary on the trial of Adolf Eichmann." in a purely political
trial, on the other hand, the parties view the fair determination of
guilt as irrelevant and are "concerned above all with the
consequences [of the trial]." 4 5 In this framework, a show trial is a
particular form of the purely political trial.46
The purely legal trial is most likely a platonic ideal that cannot
be achieved in the real world. Even run-of-the-mill criminal
prosecutions in domestic criminal justice systems are not
concerned only with the determination of guilt. Criminal justice
systems must be perceived as legitimate to be effective, 47 and the
actors within them must concern themselves with how their
actions will be perceived by society. Ultimately, it is hard to
imagine a public process where the participants did not concern
themselves at all with what effect their actions would have. Yet, it
seems likely that most domestic criminal cases are driven by fewer
consequentialist considerations than international criminal trials.4 8
The question, as Professor Turner frames it, is whether the
legal or the political concerns 49 dominate the trials. In other
words, are the trials predominantly legal or predominantly
political? Having some political or consequentialist purposes may
not be inherently undesirable. In fact, many scholars have argued
43 See Turner, supra note 1, at 533-34.
44 See Koskenniemi, supra note 1, at 7 ("The purpose of the trial is to render
justice, and nothing else; even the noblest ulterior purposes .. . can only detract from the
law's main business: to weigh the charges brought against the accused, to render
judgment and to mete out due punishment.") (quoting HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN
JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 251 (1963)).
45 Turner, supra note 1, at 534.
46 See Peterson, supra note 1, at 268-69; Turner, supra note 1, at 534.
47 See Ford, supra note 4, at 455-56; Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on
Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 376-79 (2006).
48 See Turner, supra note 1, at 536 ("Domestic trials also serve some of these
'political' purposes, but the emphasis on them in international trials is more
pronounced.").
49 The way this Article uses these terms, a political or consequentialist
consideration is any consideration that is not strictly necessary to determine the guilt of
the accused or the appropriate punishment. Not all political considerations are
necessarily detrimental. See infra note 50. Some, however, are more troubling than
others. See infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
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that international criminal tribunals should try to affect post-
conflict societies through their trials.so These might be viewed as
desirable political considerations that judges may include in their
decision-making. For example, judges may, under certain
circumstances, properly concern themselves with issues like
promoting peace and reconciliation or establishing a historical
record, even though those are consequentialist concerns. Such
concerns might lead the judges to permit evidence about more
crime sites than are strictly necessary for the prosecution to
achieve a conviction or weigh guilty pleas heavily when
determining a sentence, if they believed doing so would foster
peace and reconciliation or establish the historical record. Indeed,
the Security Council expressly found that creating the ICTY
would "contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace" in
the former Yugoslavia.52 Thus, it is clear that the Security Council
intended for the court to achieve some consequentialist goals
through its trials. But, as trials become more and more political,
they inevitably become less fair, because the focus shifts from a
determination of guilt through fair procedures to concerns about
the consequences of the trial.5 3
Thus, the dividing line between trials that are predominantly
legal and those that are predominantly political is whether the
underlying process remains one that is principally concerned with
determining guilt through fair procedures. In other words, fairness
is the tipping point. This framework is presented in Figure 1.
Once consequentialist or political considerations render the
underlying trial unfair, then the court has crossed the boundary
from a predominantly legal process into a predominantly political
process. This is clearly both impermissible and undesirable. Fair
trials are required by international law.54  Moreover, fairness is
50 See, e.g., Turner, supra note 1, at 537-43 (summarizing the arguments in favor
of having courts pursue political purposes). But see supra note 44.
51 See, e.g., Ford, supra note 4 (arguing that establishing a historical record is the
most significant contribution many international courts can make to the goal of peace
and reconciliation).
52 S.C. Res. 827, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
53 See Turner, supra note 1, at 537, 543.
54 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(1),
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20999/volume-999-1-14668-
English.pdf ("In the determination of any criminal charge against him,. . . everyone shall
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thought to be crucial to the perceived legitimacy, and thus
effectiveness, of judicial institutions."
Figure 1
Purely Purely
Political Legal
Predominantly Political Predominantly Legal
Tipping Point
So, the goal is to achieve a process that is fundamentally fair
and thus predominantly legal, even as it simultaneously serves
some desirable consequentialist purposes. Has the ICTY achieved
this goal? It is harder to place ICTY trials on the continuum
between legal and political by looking only at the content of the
indictments than it is to evaluate whether the trials are show trials.
Nevertheless, this Article will try to evaluate whether the charges
in the indictments are being used in a way that one would expect
from a court that was principally interested in determining guilt
through fair procedures. If the evidence suggests that the trials are
fundamentally fair, then this supports the conclusion that they are
predominantly legal in nature, even though they pursue some
consequentialist goals.
This evaluation will proceed in several different ways. First,
the general content of the indictments will be considered to see
whether they are internally consistent, provide sufficient
information to the accused, and comply with the requirements of
international criminal law and our understanding of how
be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent[,] and impartial
tribunal established by law.").
55 See Ford, supra note 4, at 455-56 (discussing the "fair process effect" and its
relationship to the perceived legitimacy of judicial institutions). While it has been
argued that the fair process effect cannot explain the perceived legitimacy of the ICTY in
the Balkans, it may well be very important to how the ICTY is perceived outside of the
Balkans. See id. at 456-58.
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international crimes are usually committed. Second, the charging
practices at the ICTY will be compared with charging practices in
domestic criminal justice systems. If they are similar to the
practice in domestic systems that are generally considered fair, this
is further evidence that the ICTY's practices are fair. Third,
particular attention will be paid to a number of practices that have
been criticized, like the use of joint criminal enterprise (JCE) as a
mode of liability and the fact that a large number of the accused
were ethnically Serb.
C. Politics at Other Stages of the ICTY's Work
Professor Turner's framework is a useful way of thinking
about the ICTY's work, but it is limited by its exclusive focus on
the trials. While the question of whether the trials are
fundamentally fair is clearly an important one, political influence
and political considerations can adversely affect the court's work
at other stages of the proceedings. To be thorough, one must
evaluate the effect of political considerations during at least three
stages of the court's work: (1) the founding of the court, (2) the
Prosecutor's decisions about who to charge and what to charge
them with, and (3) the trials and subsequent appeals. Professor
Turner's focus on fair trials addresses only the third stage of the
process, albeit arguably the most important one.
The role of politics in the founding of the ICTY is largely
beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses on the indictments,
but it is undisputed that the ICTY was created by an inherently
political body-the Security Council-to pursue goals that were
both legal and political.56 Some of those political purposes, such
as promoting peace and reconciliation, compiling an accurate
historical record, and providing closure to victims, may be
desirable," but there also has been criticism of the selectivity of
the Security Council's decisions to create the ICTY and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Why did the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda receive tribunals, while other
locations that had suffered serious violations of international
56 See Turner, supra note 1, at 532-33; Koskenniemi, supra note 1, at 18. See
generally WILLIAM SCHABAS, UNIMAGINABLE ATROCITIES: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND
RIGHTS AT THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 73-97 (2012) (describing the role of politics at
international tribunals).
57 See Turner, supra note 1, at 537-43.
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criminal law did not receive equal treatment?
Dugko Tadid raised this question during the first case to come
before the ICTY." In response, the Appeals Chamber noted that
the Security Council has broad discretion to decide when to take
measures not involving the use of force, including the creation of
criminal tribunals, to maintain or restore international peace and
security." In effect, the ICTY conceded that the Security Council
could base its decision on purely political considerations, so long
as it complied with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
This reasoning is legally sound, but unsatisfying. The selectivity
of the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR is symbolic of the
influence of politics in the founding of many international justice
institutions.
For example, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
(IMT) has been accused of being "victor's justice"60 because of the
way its Charter was limited so the IMT had jurisdiction only over
individuals who belonged to the Axis powers, thus exempting
Allied forces from the court's jurisdiction despite claims that
Allied officers had done some of the same things as the accused
Axis officers.6 ' Fortunately, the ICTY did not have this sort of
victor's justice built into its founding document.62 In that sense,
58 See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, T 27 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (noting that Tadid had argued that "the Security Council had
been inconsistent in creating this Tribunal while not taking a similar step in the case of
other areas of conflict in which violations of international humanitarian law may have
occurred").
59 Id. % 28-40.
60 See generally HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 122-25 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing several
commentators who have labeled the trials as "victor's justice"); see, e.g., Gerry J.
Simpson, Didactic and Dissident Histories in War Crimes Trials, 60 ALB. L. REv. 801,
805-06 (1997) (suggesting that "[t]he phrase 'victor's justice' as applied to [Nuremberg]
is by now a truism").
61 See IMT Charter art. I (limiting the court's jurisdiction to "major war criminals
of the European Axis" and excluding members of the Allied armed forces); see also
SCHABAS, supra note 56, at 74-76 (discussing conscious selectivity of the accused at the
IMT).
62 Instead, its charter granted the ICTY "the power to prosecute persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 . . . ." ICTY Charter art. 1. Jurisdiction is
not limited to individuals from particular nationalities or sides in the conflict, but
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the ICTY was less affected by overtly political considerations in
its founding than the IMT, but that founding was still
fundamentally a political process.
The next stage at which one might be worried about the
influence of political considerations is when the Prosecutor
decides who to charge. Despite some public denial, it is an open
secret that the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) at the ICTY has
both been subject to political pressures and has taken into account
political considerations in its charging decisions. 63 There are two
distinct risks here. First, there is a risk that the Prosecutor will be
influenced by political considerations not to charge or investigate
some people who should be charged or investigated. The second
concern is that the Prosecutor will be influenced by political
considerations to charge some people who should not have been
charged.
Evidence of the first kind of political influence will not show
up in the dataset because it is limited to indictments that were
issued. Nonetheless, there is good reason to worry about this kind
of political influence. In the aftermath of NATO's intervention in
Kosovo, the Prosecutor stated that NATO's use of force in Kosovo
subjected members of their militaries to the jurisdiction of the
ICTY.64 She then appointed a committee to review allegations that
certain acts by NATO forces constituted violations within the
jurisdiction of the ICTY. The committee recommended that the
Prosecutor not proceed with a formal investigation of any acts by
NATO, and the Prosecutor deferred to that recommendation.
encompasses all "persons" responsible for serious crimes. Id. The court, nevertheless,
seemed to achieve something akin to victor's justice in practice. See infra notes 64-71
and accompanying text.
63 See Luc C6td, Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in
International Criminal Law, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 162, 169-71 (2005) (criticizing the
ICTY for first prosecuting "small fries," like Tadid, "primarily on the basis of the urgent
need to prove to the international community that these first attempts at international
justice after Nuremberg could work, rather than the relative importance of holding [these
small fries] accountable for committing crimes"); see also Allison Marston Danner,
Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the
International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 510, 538-40, 543 (2003) (discussing
ICTY's failure to investigate NATO forces).
64 C6td, supra note 63, at 179-80.
65 See Danner, supra note 63, at 538-39. (discussing the committee's final report,
in which it recommended that the Prosecutor decline to investigate NATO).
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The details of this episode are troubling. There is evidence
that NATO members pressured the Prosecutor not to open an
investigation.6 6 More importantly, the reasoning of the
committee's report has been sharply criticized.6' The committee
recommended that no investigation begin, in part, because an
investigation would be "unlikely to result in the acquisition of
sufficient evidence to substantiate charges . . . ."68 Numerous
commentators have pointed out that the difficulty of obtaining
evidence is not sufficient justification for failing to open an
investigation. 69  Luc Ct6, who at that time was the Chief of
Prosecutions at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, admitted that
he was "stunned" by the work of the committee.70 Professor
Benvenuti concluded that "the Prosecutor's intent has been, on the
whole, to prevent investigation against NATO officials, and to
hide herself behind the 'technical opinion' of the Review
Committee."" Thus, there is evidence that political considerations
contributed to the decision by the Prosecutor not to pursue an
investigation against individuals who may have committed
violations of international law within the jurisdiction of the court.
The second concern is that the Prosecutor will be influenced
by political considerations to charge some people who should not
be charged, based purely on a legal evaluation of the evidence. If
one assumes that the trials are fundamentally fair,7 2 then one
66 See Mandel, supra note 3, at 115; Ct6, supra note 63, at 183; Danner, supra
note 63, at 538-39.
67 See, e.g., Paolo Benvenuti, The ICTY Prosecutor and the Review of the NATO
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503
(2001) (critically analyzing the ICTY Review Committee's report); see also Mandel,
supra note 3, at 95 (describing the ICTY as a hoax for its refusal to investigate NATO);
C6, supra note 63, at 179-83 (criticizing the two main reasons for the committee's
decision).
68 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 I.L.M. 1257
90, at 1282-83 (June 8, 2000).
69 See, e.g., C6t, supra note 63, at 182 ("The second reason - anticipating
difficulties to obtain evidence while no investigative means have yet been deployed by
the Prosecutor - is even more worrisome and raises serious questions of credibility.").
70 Id. at 182 ("These explanations, given by members of the Office of the
Prosecutor, leave us stunned.").
71 See Benvenuti, supra note 67, at 505.
72 See infra Section VI (concluding that the trials are fundamentally fair).
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would expect cases that are legally weak, but pursued for political
reasons, to result in acquittals at higher rates than average. Thus,
this Article will look at acquittal rates for evidence of classes of
cases with disproportionately high rates of acquittals. If such
cases exist, they may be evidence that the Prosecutor was swayed
by consequentialist considerations to prosecute some people for
whom the evidence was lacking. This would be undesirable,
because prosecutors should not initiate or continue prosecutions
unless an impartial investigation demonstrates that there is
sufficient evidence to justify a conviction.
III. Demographics of the Accused
A. Sex and Age
The ICTY has indicted 161 people. Of the indictees, only
Biljana Plavgi was female. This is broadly consistent with the
composition of offenders in domestic criminal justice systems. In
the United States, 87% of those accused of violent offenses are
male; 74 97% of those accused of murder are male.75  The
proportion of male-to-female offenders appears to be quite similar
in Europe.7 6 More generally, it appears that men represent the vast
majority of offenders across all crimes in all criminal justice
73 See Eighth United Nations Cong. on the Prevention Of Crime and the Treatment
of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990, United Nations Guidelines on the
Role of Prosecutors, art. 14, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professionallnterest/Pages/RoleOfProsecutors.aspx.
[hereinafter U.N Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors] ("Prosecutors shall not initiate
or continue prosecution, or shall make every effort to stay proceedings, when an
impartial investigation shows the charge to be unfounded.").
74 THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 228944, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES,
2006 app. tbl.3, at 20 (May 2010) [hereinafter BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS].
75 Id
76 See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, GLOBAL STUDY ON
HOMICIDE 71 (Vienna, 2011) (indicating that 88% of those charged with homicide in
Europe are male); MARCEL F. AEBI ET AL., EUROPEAN SOURCEBOOK OF CRIME AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS tbl.1.2.3.6, at 91 (4th ed. 2010) (indicating that on average
91% of those accused of homicide in Europe were male). The slightly higher rate at
which women are charged with murder in Europe may result from the relatively smaller
proportion of murders in Europe that are the result of gang or organized crime violence
versus family violence. See GLOBAL STUDY ON HOMICIDE, supra note 76, at 70-73
(discussing the differences in violent crime in the United States and Europe).
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systems.7 Put another way, "[c]rime, especially violent crime, is
typically a male activity. . " This is particularly true in
situations where the violence is organized, such as with gangs and
organized crime." Thus it is hardly surprising that such an
overwhelming percentage of the accused at international criminal
tribunals are male, given that serious violations of international
criminal law tend to involve systematic acts of violence by
hierarchically-organized groups.so
ICTY indictees span a broad range of ages."' The youngest
was 21; the oldest was 76. Their average age was 40. In contrast,
the average defendant accused of a violent offense in the United
States is 31,82 and the average age of those accused of murder is
28.83 The pattern in the U.S. appears to be replicated elsewhere, as
those charged as perpetrators of violence in other domestic
criminal justice systems also tend to be in their 20s or early 30s.84
Thus, those indicted by the ICTY have generally been older than
those accused of violent crimes in domestic systems. On the other
hand, the average age of those charged as direct perpetrators of
physical violence" at the ICTY was 34, which is much closer to
77 See INTERNATIONAL STATISTICS ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 89 (Stefan Harrendorf et
al. eds., 2010) (noting that the proportion of all those charged with a crime across all
criminal justice systems that were female was typically 10%-15%).
78 GLOBAL STUDY ON HOMICIDE, supra note 76, at 63.
79 Id. at 70-73.
80 See infra note 91 and accompanying text (noting the organized political nature
of war crimes).
81 Age here means age in the year 1995, so as to approximately measure the age of
the accused at the time of the commission of the alleged crimes.
82 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 74, app. tbl.2, at 4.
83 Id.
84 Cf MARIE VIRUEDA & JASON PAYNE, HOMICIDE IN AUSTRALIA: 2007-2008
NATIONAL HOMICIDE MONITORING PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT 27 (Australian Institute of
Criminology, 2010) (noting that the average age of homicide offenders in Australia was
31.8 years); Katie Willis, Armed Robbery: Who Commits It and Why?, TRENDS & ISSUES
IN CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2, No. 328 (Australian Institute of Criminology, Nov.
2006) (noting that most convicted armed robbers in Australia are under the age of 30).
85 In international criminal law, a distinction is sometimes made between direct
perpetrators of physical violence (the people responsible for carrying out crimes like
murder, torture, and inhumane treatment) and those who have not engaged in any
physical violence but are nonetheless criminally liable for that violence (e.g., those who
order that murders be carried out). These indirect perpetrators are often political or
military leaders who can be quite far from the scene of the violence in both geographical
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the norm for direct perpetrators in the United States and
elsewhere.
There was a moderate correlation8 6 (r = .47) between age and
the seniority of the accused in the political and military hierarchy.
In other words, the older defendants were likely to be more senior.
Age also correlated with some, but not all, of the modes of
liability. There was a moderate negative correlation between age
and an accusation of direct participation in violence (r = -.50) and
a weak positive correlation between age and the use of superior
responsibility (r = .25). Thus those accused as direct perpetrators
were generally younger, while those charged as superiors tended
to be older. There was neither a correlation between an accused's
and organizational terms. They can nevertheless be criminally liable for the violence.
This liability is established through the use of "modes of liability," such as co-
perpetration, joint criminal enterprise, and superior responsibility, which play a pivotal
role in international criminal law but are usually used less often in domestic criminal law
where the majority of accused are direct perpetrators of violence. See Robert Cryer et
al., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, 361-74
(Cambridge University Press 2d ed. 2010).
86 This Article will often report the correlation between two variables. Correlation
is described in terms of an r value. The r value can vary between -1 and I and indicates
the extent to which the values of two variables are related to one another. A negative r
value indicates that the variables move in opposite directions (i.e., an increase in one is
associated with a decrease in the other). A positive r indicates that the variables move in
the same direction. An r of 0 indicates that there is no relationship between the variables
(i.e., they move randomly). The absolute value of r (shown as Ir) indicates the strength
of the relationship between the two variables. In describing such correlations, this
Article adopts the following approach: an Ir between 0 and .2 shows no correlation, an Ir|
between .2 and .4 shows a weak correlation, an Ir| value between .4 and .6 shows a
moderate correlation, an Ir between .6 and .8 shows a strong correlation, and an Irl
between .8 and 1 shows a very strong correlation. For Ir| values greater than .2, the
cutoffs for the use of particular terms are somewhat arbitrary, but it is helpful to describe
the strength of correlations consistently. However, the lower bound of .2 as evidence of
a correlation is driven by the statistical significance of the relationship between the two
variables. For all variables in this article, the number of observations lies between 97
and 161. Given a two-tailed probability test, a required significance of p = .05, and at
least 95 degrees of freedom, an Ir| of .2 or greater is necessary for the results to be
significant. In other words, an Ir| greater than .2 indicates a greater than 95% chance that
there is a relationship between the variables, and a less than 5% chance that the observed
correlation is simply a product of random chance. As Ir| increases above .2, the chance
that the correlation is the product of random chance grows smaller and smaller. See
generally DAVID FREEDMAN ET AL., STATISTICS: FOURTH EDITION 119-57 (W.W. Norton
& Co. New York, 2007) (discussing statistical principles regarding correlations between
multiple variables).
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age and the number of charged counts (r = -.07) nor a correlation
between an accused's age and the sentence length received (r =
.07).
These results are consistent with what we understand about the
commission of violations of international criminal law. Direct
perpetrators of violence were young, male, and not very high in
the hierarchy. In fact, they look quite a bit like direct perpetrators
of violence in the United States and in other domestic criminal
justice systems. Older accused are more likely to have held senior
positions within the hierarchy, and thus be more distant from the
direct commission of crimes. Older accused were also more likely
to be charged with superior responsibility as a mode of liability,
which is consistent with their positions of authority over others.87
B. Role
The indictees fall into one of four categories: prison camp
personnel (38), military personnel (89), politicians (29), and
indictees that held both military and political positions (5)." For
example, Milan Marti6 was, at various times, alleged to be Chief
of Police in Knin, Deputy Commander of the Territorial Defense
Forces of the Serbian Autonomous Oblast of Krajina (SAO
Krajina), Minister of Defense of the SAO Krajina, and eventually
President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina." He was classified
as having held both military and political positions. Dugko Tadi6,
on the other hand, was alleged to have beaten and killed detainees
while working as a guard at the Omarska, Keraterm, and Trnopolje
camps. 90 He was put in the prison camp personnel category. The
composition of the indictees by type is shown below in Table 1.
87 See infra note 163 and accompanying text (explaining that one of the elements
of superior responsibility is the existence of a superior/subordinate relationship).
88 The accused were placed into one of the categories based on the title and
positions they were alleged to have held in the indictment. See ICTY Trial Dataset,
supra note 21.
89 Prosecutor v. Milan Marti6, Case No. IT-95-l l, Amended Indictment, if 10-16
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 14, 2003), www.icty.org/x/cases/
martic/ind/en/mar-2ai051209e.pdf.
90 See generally Prosecutor v. Tadid & Borovnica, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Second
Amended Indictment, T$ 4-4.5 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14,
1995), www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/indlen/tad-2ai951214e.pdf (describing the allegations
against Tadi6).
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Table 1 - The Types of Accused
Prison camp personnel 24%
Military personnel 55%
Politicians 18%
Both military and political 3%
67
There was a stronger correlation between type of indictee and
seniority (r = .68) than between age and seniority. Prison camp
personnel were the least senior, military personnel had the most
range in their seniority and included both relatively junior and
relatively senior personnel, while politicians and those that held
both military and political positions were the most senior
indictees. The majority of the accused at the ICTY were military
personnel. Politicians (and those who were both military officers
and politicians) comprised a smaller percentage of the accused, but
represented the most senior accused.
Not surprisingly, the prison camp personnel were the group
most likely to be charged as direct perpetrators of physical
violence (95% of them were so charged), followed by the military
personnel (40%). There was a strong negative correlation
(r = -.63) between seniority and a charge of direct perpetration
among the military personnel, indicating that most of the direct
perpetrators among this group were low ranking. Politicians and
those that had both military and political functions were rarely
accused of directly committing physical violence. This is
consistent with a hierarchical system wherein the vast majority of
physical violence is committed by those lowest in the hierarchy.9 1
In contrast, the majority of physical violence in domestic criminal
91 See Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 159, 159-60 (2007) (noting that international criminal violations are
usually the result of the collective actions of many individuals working towards the same
ends); see Antonio Cassese, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the
Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 109, 110 (2007) (noting
that violations of international criminal law share the common thread of being
"expression[s] of collective criminality," perpetrated by "groups of individuals, military
details, paramilitary units[,] or government officials acting in unison or in pursuance of a
policy").
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justice systems is carried out by individuals acting alone.9 2
Role had no measurable impact on the legal process. There
was no correlation between role and the sentence received (r = .01)
and the average sentences for indictees in each role were similar.93
Similarly, role did not have a significant association with the
number of counts alleged against the accused.94 There is no
evidence that particular groups of accused, like the military
officers or the politicians, were charged with significantly more
crimes or received stiffer sentences.
C. Ethnicity
Ethnicity is a sensitive topic in the former Yugoslavia. Most
ethnic Serbs believe the ICTY is biased and anti-Serb.9 5 Observers
have generally rejected such assertions,9 6 but it is true that the
largest number of accused have been ethnically Serbian (109) and
a much smaller number of accused have been either ethnically
Croatian (33) or Bosniak (7). The indictees' ethnic composition is
shown below in Table 2. It is also true that, if convicted, ethnic
Serbs received slightly longer average prison sentences (19 years)
than ethnic Croats (17 years) and much longer average sentences
than ethnic Bosniaks (3 years).
92 For example, in Australia, 87% of homicides were carried out by an individual
acting alone. See HOMICIDE IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 84, at 5 (noting that only 13% of
homicides involved more than one offender). Only one homicide in all of Australia
during 2007-2008 involved both multiple victims and multiple offenders. Id.
93 If convicted, the prison camp guards received an average sentence of 14.1 years,
the military personnel received an average sentence of 15.8 years, and the politicians
received an average sentence of 16.2 years.
94 The average number of counts alleged against each of the different roles fell
between 8 and 12 counts per indictment. The average for the indictments as a whole was
10.5.
95 See Ford, supra note 4, at 412-18 (describing how each ethnicity's internal
narrative determined its view of the ICTY).
96 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the fairness of the ICTY
proceedings).
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If one assumed that each ethnic group committed an equal
number of crimes of equal gravity, one would probably predict
that the Prosecutor would indict equal numbers of accused from
each ethnic group, and that the judges would impose equivalent
sentences. Given this assumption of equivalence, the ethnic
distribution of the accused and the sentences would suggest anti-
Serb bias at the ICTY. There is little support, however, for such
an assumption of equivalence. The indictments allege that Serbs
are responsible for more serious and widespread crimes. For
example, the average number of deaths for which the accused Serb
is allegedly responsible exceeds 1,000, while that number is less
than 100 for the accused Croat or Bosniak." Serbs were also
accused of committing crimes at a larger number of crime sites
than Croats or Bosniaks, although the differences are not as
striking. Finally, only ethnic Serbs were charged with genocide,
and genocide convictions generally carry longer sentences than
war crimes or crimes against humanity convictions.98 Thus the
longer sentences for ethnic Serbs are consistent with allegations of
committing a larger number of more serious crimes.
Of course, if one begins with the assumption that the ICTY
was biased against Serbs, one would probably attribute the
97 These figures come with a caveat as it was sometimes difficult to determine how
many deaths the accused was alleged to be responsible for because of the wording of the
indictments. See infra notes 167-168 and accompanying text. These averages are based
on only those accused for whom a precise number of deaths was recorded in the database
(n = 45).
98 See infra note 131 (comparing the sentences for crimes against humanity and
genocide).
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Table 2 - Ethnicity of Indictees
Serb 68%
Croat 21%
Bosniak 4%
Kosovar Albanian 4%
Macedonians 1%
Unknown 2%
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consistency between indictments and sentences to anti-Serb bias as
well. While it is possible that the indictments were systematically
biased against ethnic Serbs by the OTP, there is little evidence to
support such a finding. If anything, the evidence suggests that the
OTP tried too hard to find non-Serbs to prosecute in a misguided
attempt to appear impartial.9 9 Rather, the ethnic distribution of the
accused and the sentences is consistent with another explanation:
ethnic Serbs were responsible for the largest number of crimes and
the most serious crimes committed during the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia.
Extensive evidence, including contemporaneous documents,
photographic and video evidence, forensic evidence, and
numerous confessions, supports the conclusion that ethnic Serbs
were responsible for some of the worst atrocities committed
during the conflict, including the massacre at Srebrenica.'0o
Moreover, demographic studies of deaths caused by the conflict
demonstrate that Bosniaks represented by far the largest group of
victims, including the most civilian deaths.o' Finally, multiple
assessments have concluded that Serb forces were responsible for
approximately 90% of the crimes committed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina during the conflict.'0 2 In short, it appears that the
larger number of Serbian accused and the longer sentences of
Serbian accused are justified by the fact that Serbs committed both
99 See infra Section V.B (discussing the relatively weak cases pursued against non-
Serbs).
100 See Ford, supra note 4, at 415, 473-75 (discussing the massacre at Srebrenica
and objective evidence supporting the theory that the Serbs were responsible); see also
Liam McDowall, Bridging the Gap between the ICTY and Communities in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Conference Series (Communications Service of the Registry of the ICTY,
May 21, 2005), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Outreach/Bridging-theGap/srebrenica-en.pdf
(last visited Sept. 1, 2013) (summarizing the forensic and photographic evidence of what
happened at Srebrenica).
101 See, e.g., J. Zwierzchowski & E. Tabeau, Census-Based Multiple System
Estimation as an Unbiased Method of Estimation of Casualties' Undercount tbl.4, fig.2,
tbl.6, at 14-17 (Conference Paper for the European Population Conference, Vienna, Sep.
2010), available at http://epc201O.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionld=100880
(discussing the ethnicity of civilian victims).
102 See Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial
Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 583, 647
n.200 (2007) (explaining that the Central Intelligence Agency and a U.N. Commission of
Experts both separately concluded that about 90% of the crimes in Bosnia were
committed by Serbs).
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the largest number of crimes and the most serious crimes.
Rather than being driven by actual ICTY bias, Serb
perceptions of bias can be explained by the conflict between a
common Serb narrative of victimhood and the ICTY's attribution
to Serbs of both the responsibility for the conflict and for the
majority of the crimes committed during the conflict.10 3 Serbs
identified much more strongly with their own social group than
they did with the court.'04 Thus, they were motivated to retain a
positive view of their group and reject the ICTY's indictments and
judgments, which cast them as the principal aggressors in the
conflict. They did this by concluding that the ICTY was biased
and unjust. This permitted them to preserve their positive self-
view and dismiss the work of the court."0 ' But Serbs' perceptions
of bias at the ICTY were not based upon an honest appraisal of the
responsibility of ethnic Serbs for serious violations of international
law committed during the conflict.
D. Seniority
To evaluate the role of seniority in the indictments, the
accused were ranked on a scale of 1 to 9 for their overall seniority
in the political and military hierarchies in the former
Yugoslavia.10 6 Initially, the ICTY indicted 37 individuals with a
seniority rating of 1, all of whom were prison camp guards or low-
ranking soldiers. There have been suggestions that these
indictments were driven by political considerations.'0 7 They were
indicted early in the life of the ICTY and only 15 of them were
actually tried. The indictments against the rest were either
103 See generally Ford, supra note 4 (discussing the role ethnicity plays in views of
ICTY legitimacy).
104 Id
105 Id
106 For accused in the military, this was determined by examining their rank in their
respective armed forces and the size of the unit of which they were alleged to be in
charge. For accused with political positions, it was determined by their title and the size
of the political unit of which they were alleged to be part of the leadership. The military
and political rankings were then combined, while trying to preserve the reality that the
military officers reported to the politicians. Cf Meernik, supra note 19, at 151
(describing a methodology for ranking the seniority of the accused).
107 See Ctd, supra note 63, at 169-70 (suggesting that these indictments were
driven by the Prosecutor's need to show to the court's backers that it was functioning).
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withdrawn for insufficient evidence, withdrawn on the basis that
the indictee was insufficiently important, or the case was
transferred to a domestic court in the former Yugoslavia. This was
done, in part, in response to a recognition that the early cases
focused too heavily on prison guards and low-level soldiers, rather
than those leaders believed to be responsible for orchestrating the
violence.'s
The picture is somewhat different if we look at those who have
been, or will actually be, tried at the ICTY.109 Figure 2 below
compares the seniority of those indicted to the seniority of those
tried. After initially indicting a large number of low-level
perpetrators, the ICTY eventually focused its efforts on trying
higher-ranking indictees. This change in policy was formalized in
the Completion Strategy, 1 o which emphasized trying "the most
senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for
crimes .
108 See Heikelina Verrijn Stuart & Marlise Simons, THE PROSECUTOR AND THE
JUDGE: BENJAMIN FERENCZ AND ANTONIO CASSESE - INTERVIEWS AND WRITINGS 53-54
(Amsterdam University Press, 2009) (explaining that Judge Antonio Cassese pushed the
ICTY judges to avoid trying low-level alleged criminals, stating that "[w]e have been set
up at the expense of the international community, we have an important task, and so we
have to go after the leaders").
109 This group includes those whose trials have been completed, those who died
during a trial, those currently at trial, and those awaiting trial.
110 Completion Strategy, ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/10016 (last visited Sept. 1,
2013) (explaining that the "Completion Strategy" refers to a series of proposals by the
Tribunal's judges to guide and ensure that the ICTY concluded its mission successfully).
111 S.C. Res. 1534 1 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004). See also Dominic
Raab, Evaluating the ICTY and its Completion Strategy, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 82, 87
(2005); Fausto Pocar, Completion or Continuation Strategy?, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 655,
656-58 (2008) (describing how the ICTY embraced the Completion Strategy as a way to
ensure continued international support for the tribunal's work).
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Figure 2 - Seniority of Accused
40
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Seniority
As Figure 2 shows, the ICTY complied with the Completion
Strategy largely by dropping cases against the least senior
indictees, most of whom were prison camp guards. It maintained
the cases against both the senior accused and the mid-level
accused. This practice seems inconsistent with that portion of the
mandate that urged the trial of the "most senior leaders.""12 This
inconsistency appears to have been the result of a tug of war
between the Security Council and the judges on one side, and the
Prosecutor on the other side, over how many people to indict and
try." 3  The Prosecutor has principal responsibility for deciding
who should be charged" 4 and was able to go ahead with plans to
try most of the mid-level accused despite the Security Council
pushing for fewer trials of higher-ranking accused."' In the
Prosecutor's defense, mid-level accused have been found to be
responsible for some of the most serious crimes."' Thus, the
Prosecutor's approach does seem to be consistent with the part of
the Completion Strategy's mandate that urges trials of those "most
responsible for crimes."' 17
There were no correlations between seniority and the total
112 S.C. Res. 1534, supra note 11, 5.
113 See Raab, supra note I11, at 84-88. (describing the formation of the Completion
Strategy).
114 See generally Ct6, supra note 63.
115 See Wald, supra note 10, at 468-69.
116 See infra notes 219-220 and accompanying text.
117 S.C. Res. 1534, supra note 11, 5.
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number of counts that the indictees were charged with (r .19)18
or the sentence that the indictees eventually received (r = .03)."19
In other words, more senior indictees were not charged with more
crimes and did not tend to receive higher sentences than less
senior indictees. This finding is inconsistent with allegations that
the ICTY trials were shams designed to punish the political
enemies of the United States and its allies.12 0
IV. The Contents of the Indictments
A. Charges
The indictments were coded to capture the charges included in
them. Each separate count was recorded as either an alleged war
crime, crime against humanity, or act of genocide. No attempt
was made to differentiate between the various underlying acts that
could have given rise to these charges (e.g., murder as a crime
against humanity and torture as a crime against humanity were
both coded the same way).
Commission of war crimes is by far the most common charge
at the ICTY. Of the 161 indictees, only 2 were not charged with
any war crimes. This is not surprising, as the ICTY was set up
principally to prosecute violations of international humanitarian
law.' 2' The median 2 2 ICTY accused was charged with 4 war
118 This result is, however, close to being significant.
119 This is mildly surprising as earlier studies did find a connection between
seniority and the resulting sentences. See Meernik, supra note 19, at 157; see also
Barbora Hold et al., Is ICTY Sentencing Predictable? An Empirical Analysis of ICTY
Sentencing Practice, 22 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 79, 90 (2009) ("[T]he highest-ranking
individuals have been sentenced to substantially longer terms than their subordinates.").
The court itself, however, is ambivalent about whether there should be a link between
seniority and the sentence. See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial
Chamber Judgment, $ 709 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf ("A high rank in the military
or political field does not, in itself, lead to a harsher sentence. But a person who abuses
or wrongly exercises power deserves a harsher sentence than an individual acting on his
or her own.").
120 See, e.g., Hayden supra note 2.
121 S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993).
122 The median of a data series is the value that lies in the middle of the series once
they are ordered from smallest to largest. Half of the values will lie above the median
and half will lie below the median. The mean or average, on the other hand, is calculated
by summing the values in the series and dividing the sum by the number of values. Both
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crimes. The most common approach (the mode), however, was to
charge the accused with a single war crime, which happened 44
times. Only 6 individuals were charged with 20 or more war
crimes. The individual charged with the largest number of war
crimes, 40, was Slobodan Milogevid, the former President of
Serbia.
Crimes against humanity was the next most common charge at
the ICTY. All but 19 of the accused were charged with a crime
against humanity. The median ICTY accused was charged with 4
crimes against humanity. This was also the most common result,
as 32 individuals were charged with 4 crimes against humanity,
followed by 23 individuals who were charged with 5 crimes
against humanity. In contrast to war crimes where single charges
were common, an accused was charged with a single crime against
humanity only 13 times. On the other hand, 10 accused were
charged with 10 or more crimes against humanity. Slobodan
Milogevi6 was charged with crimes against humanity 24 times, the
most of anyone charged.
A genocide charge was comparatively rare, in keeping with its
status as the "crime of crimes" and the difficulty of establishing
the requisite specific intent.12 3 Only 22 of the 161 accused were
charged with genocide, including Slobodan Milogevid. All of
those accused of genocide were ethnic Serbs.
All told, the ICTY charged 161 individuals with 902 counts of
war crimes, 664 counts of crimes against humanity, and 40 counts
of genocide. The median ICTY accused was charged with 4 war
crimes, 4 crimes against humanity, and 0 counts of genocide. 124
While there have been concerns about over-charging by the
averages and medians can provide useful information about the data series, but for some
purposes medians are more useful. In particular, if one is interested in where the center
of the distribution lies, the median value is better than the average because medians,
unlike averages, are not as influenced by values that lie at the extreme ends of the
distribution.
123 See Robert Petit et al., Exploring Critical Issues in Religious Genocide: Case
Studies of Violence in Tibet, Iraq and Gujarat, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 163, 213
(2008).
124 The average ICTY accused was charged with 10.5 counts. However, this
average was strongly affected by a few outliers who were charged with large numbers of
counts. In fact, less than 30% of the accused were charged with more than the average
number of counts.
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Prosecutor,125 the charges against the accused appear to have been
relatively modest given the seriousness of the allegations in the
indictments. Indeed, these indictments often included allegations
against accuseds of causing hundreds or thousands of unlawful
deaths, as well as charges of widespread torture; unlawful
imprisonment; inhumane treatment; and forcible transfer.12 6 The
most extensive charges were against Slobodan Milogevid, who
was accused of 40 counts of war crimes, 24 counts of crimes
against humanity, and 2 counts of genocide. However, the charges
against Milogevid were also extremely serious-he was essentially
charged with being responsible for the entire conflict in the
Balkans.'2 7
Contrary to some suggestions, 128 there was no correlation
between the total number of counts and sentence length (r = .17).
On the other hand, there was a moderate correlation (r = .45)
between charging genocide and sentence length. This correlation
does not mean, however, that charging genocide causes an
increased sentence length. 129  Rather, it seems likely that the
correlation between an allegation of genocide and a longer
sentence is actually a correlation between genocide convictions
and longer sentences, and that the genocide charge is acting as a
proxy for that underlying relationship.130 For example, a genocide
charge did not correlate with an increased likelihood of
conviction,1 3 1 even though it did correlate with a longer sentence.
The correlation between the number of crimes against
125 See Wald, supra note 10, at 469.
126 See infra Section IV.C (describing the gravity of the crimes alleged to have been
committed).
127 See Ford, supra note 4, at 415 ("[T]he ICTY essentially accused Slobodan
Milosevid and the Serb political leadership of masterminding the whole conflict.").
128 See Gillian Higgins, The Impact of the Size, Scope and Scale of the Milogevi6
Trial and the Development of Rule 73bis before the ICTY, 7 Nw J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 239,
258 (2009) (quoting Judge Kwon as saying "by charging the accused with more crimes
through more modes of responsibility, the Prosecutor apparently believes that she stands
a greater chance of convicting the accused on at least one charge").
129 See FREEDMAN ET AL., supra note 86, at 150-52 (noting that correlations
measure the association between two variables and do not measure causation).
130 See, e.g., Hold et al., supra note 20, tbl.1, at 421, 422-23 (concluding that "[tlhe
sentences for genocide are substantially longer[]" than the sentences for war crimes or
crimes against humanity).
131 See infra Section V.B.
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humanity charged and the sentence was very weak (r = .24), while
there was no correlation between the number of war crimes
charged (r = .04) and the sentence. Ultimately, apart from a
genocide charge, the number and type of charges had little
correlation with the end result. This is consistent with a court that
makes decisions based on the evidence presented at trial rather
than slavishly following the allegations in the indictment.
A comparison of ICTY charging practices to domestic
practices in the United States suggests that ICTY practices are not
unreasonable. Of defendants accused of murder in the United
States, 65% are also charged with one or more additional
felonies.'3 2 It seems reasonable to assume that the vast majority of
these individuals were charged with a single murder,' yet the
majority of them were charged with more than one crime
stemming from that murder. Given that the allegations in the
ICTY often involved the deaths of hundreds or thousands of
people, a median of 8 counts does not seem excessive.
Moreover, when mass killings have been charged in the United
States, the accused has often been charged with one or more
counts per victim. For example, Timothy McVeigh, one of the
Oklahoma City bombers, was charged in federal court with 8
counts of murder,'34 1 for each of the 8 federal officials who died
in the blast' that ultimately killed 168 people. 3 6  He was
subsequently convicted and executed.'37 Had he not been
executed, he would have been charged in state court with
additional counts arising out of the other deaths caused by the
bombing.' His accomplice, Terry Nichols, was charged in
132 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 74, app. tbl.1, at 18.
133 For example, in Australia only 4% of homicides involve the death of more than
one victim. See VIRUEDA & PAYNE, supra note 84, at 5.
134 See Mark Eddy et al., Guilty on Every Count, DENVER POST, June 3, 1997,
available at http://extras.denverpost.com/bomb/bombvl.htm.
'3 5 Id.
136 See Lois Romano & Tom Kenworthy, Prosecutor Paints McVeigh as 'Twisted'
US. Terrorist, WASHINGTON PosT, Apr. 25, 1997, at AOl.
137 See Christopher S. Wren, McVeigh is Executed for Oklahoma City Bombing,
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/1 1/
national/i I CND-EXECUTE.html.
138 See Oklahoma to Try Terry Nichols on Murder and Bomb Charges, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 30, 1999, at A20.
2013 77
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
federal court with conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction,
for which he received a life sentence.13 9 He was subsequently
charged in state court with 160 counts of first-degree murder.140
Other similar cases follow this pattern. John Allen
Muhammed, the "Beltway Sniper," was convicted of 6 counts of
first-degree murder in Maryland and 2 counts of capital murder in
Virginia stemming from shooting 16 people and causing 10
deaths.'4 1 John E. Holmes, accused of opening fire in a crowded
theater and killing 12 people and injuring dozens more, was
charged with more than 160 counts of first-degree murder and
attempted murder.4 2 In short, in the United States, it appears that
people who commit mass murder are usually charged with 1 count
per victim, and sometimes more. At the ICTY, the practice is to
generally charge 1 count per incident, even if the incident in
question involved a substantial number of victims. In comparison
to domestic practice in the United States, ICTY charging practices
do not look overly aggressive.
On the other hand, the U.S. system may not be the best
comparator. There is evidence that the U.S. system encourages
prosecutors to strategically over-charge crimes so as to be able to
affect the minimum sentences that accused receive and to have
leverage during guilty pleas." By comparison, most European
systems do not have these structural incentives to over-charge. 14 4
Thus, it is likely that charging practices in Europe tend to involve
fewer and lesser charges, as well as shorter sentences. 14 5
Unfortunately, statistical data on charging practices in Europe
139 See Jo Thomas, Terry Nichols Gets Life Term in Bombing Plot, N.Y. TIMES,
June 5, 1998, at Al.
140 See Oklahoma to Try Terry Nichols on Murder and Bomb Charges, supra note
138, at A20.
141 See Ian Urbina, Washington-Area Sniper Convicted of 6 More Killings, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2006, at A14; Adam Liptak, Virginia Justices Set Death Sentence in
Washington Sniper Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2005, at A9.
142 See Jack Healy & Dan Frosch, At Hearing, Police Recall Details of Horror at
Colorado Movie Theater, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2013, at Al l.
143 See Michael Tonry, Prosecutors and Politics in Comparative Perspective, 41
CRIME& JUST. 1, 21-23 (2012).
144 Id
145 Sentencing practices in Europe are discussed later. See infra notes 235-237 and
accompanying text.
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were unavailable at the time of this writing. Looking at practices
in some recent mass killings, however, it appears that charging
practices in Europe may differ by country.
For example, Anders Breivik was accused of killing 77 people
and seriously wounding 42 more in Norway in July 2011. He was
charged with 3 crimes, 2 arising out of a bombing in downtown
Oslo, and I arising out of shootings that took place on the island of
Utaya.14 6  In contrast, the individuals behind the Madrid train
bombings in March 2004 that killed 192 people and wounded
more than 1,400147 were charged quite differently. They were
collectively charged with 192 counts of murder; 1,773 counts of
attempted murder; 5 counts of terrorist attacks; several counts of
membership in and support of terrorist organizations; and several
counts related to possession of explosives, as well as forgery of
official documents.148
In effect, the Madrid train bombers were charged with a
separate count arising out of each death and serious injury,
whereas Breivik was charged with a small number of counts, each
of which incorporated numerous deaths or injuries that took place
at the same time and place. The charging practice in the Breivik
case looks more like that at international criminal courts, which
rarely charge the accused with separate counts arising out of each
death or serious injury, while the charging practice in the Madrid
train bombings is more similar to the practice in the United States.
In any event, the ICTY's charging practices seem to fall within the
146 More specifically, he was charged with I count of premeditated murder with
aggravating circumstances and 1 count of using an explosion to cause loss of life or
extensive property damage for the Oslo bombing. He was charged with 1 count of
premeditated murder with aggravating circumstances for the shootings at Utoya. See
Anders Behring Breivik: The Indictment, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 16, 2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/16/anders-behring-breivik-indictment (last
visited Sept. 1, 2013) (providing an English translation of the indictment).
147 See Elaine Sciolino, Spain Struggles to Cope as the Equation of Terror Changes
in an Instant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2004, at A8.
148 It appears that the dossier from the investigating judge, which includes the
confirmation of charges, is available only in Spanish. See Atentados Terroristas del Dia
II de Marzo de 2004 en Madrid, Sumario No. 20/2004, http://estaticos.elmundo.es/
documentos/2006/04/l l/autollm/01.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2013). The legal
qualification of the charges comes at pages 1445 and 1446 (pages 305-06 of PDF) in the
fourth part of the document. See id. at 305-06, available at http://estaticos.elmundo.es/
documentos/2006/04/1 1/auto I lm/04.pdf.
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range of charging practices found in countries with legal systems
that are generally recognized as fair.
B. Modes ofLiability
The indictments were coded for the modes of liability under
which the accused were charged. Modes of liability are principles
of liability that "apply across the various [substantive] offences
and provide for the doctrines by which a person may commit,
participate in, or otherwise be found responsible for those
crimes."l49 The possible modes of liability were aiding and
abetting, planning, ordering, instigating, direct commission,
superior responsibility, and JCE. One thing that was immediately
apparent was the use of boilerplate language that appeared in a
large number of ICTY indictments. For example, it is common to
see indictments that charge the accused with having "planned,
instigated, ordered, committed or in whose planning, preparation,
or execution he otherwise aided and abetted" all of the alleged
crimes in the indictment.' To quantify this, there were strong
correlations between the use of aiding and abetting as a mode of
liability on the one hand, and planning (r = .71), instigating
(r = .61), and ordering (r = .54) on the other hand, indicating that
these modes of liability were frequently used together. This
"kitchen sink" approach suggests that the prosecution used these
modes of liability somewhat indiscriminately.
As a mode of liability, aiding and abetting was alleged 103
times, planning 102 times, ordering 95 times, instigating 89 times,
and direct commission 72 times. The results are shown below in
Figure 3. There was no correlation between the use of these
modes of liability and the sentence. 151
149 See Cryer, supra note 85, at 361. See also id. at 361-401 (summarizing how
modes of liability are used in international criminal law).
150 See, e.g., Milan Martik, supra note 89,1 3.
151 The r values for the correlations between sentence length and aiding and
abetting, ordering, planning, instigating, and direct perpetration were all between -.2 and
.2.
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Figure 3 - Frequency of the Use of Modes of
Liability
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Despite a focus on the use and alleged overuse of JCE in
academic literature, 15 2 it was alleged only 64 times, the least of all
the modes of liability. Less than half of the ICTY's accused were
charged as part of a JCE. The largest JCE, composed of 61
individuals or organizations, was alleged in the cases against
Ratko Mladid and Slobodan Milogevi6. These were also some of
the most serious allegations made by the ICTY, against some of
the most senior accused, and they involved allegedly illegal acts
committed at hundreds of crime sites, 5 3 so it is perhaps not
surprising that they allegedly involved large JCEs. The most
frequently charged JCE, however, involved just 7 individuals, and
the median JCE involved 14 individuals. In practice, JCEs do not
appear to have been as broad as some have suggested.15 4 Given
the seriousness of the allegations 5 ' and the organized and
152 See Cassese, supra note 91, at 114-23 (describing several different criticisms of
using JCE as a mode of liability in the international criminal law context); see generally
Steven Powles, Joint Criminal Liability: Criminal Liability by Prosecutorial Ingenuity
and Judicial Creativity?, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 606 (2004) (criticizing the use of JCE as
a mode of liability within the ICTY); Turner, supra note 1, at 560-63.
153 For example, Slobodan Milogevid was charged with crimes occurring at 435
crime sites in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.
154 One ICTY defense counsel said that JCE was "too broad and ambiguous so that
[a] vast number of people may be included in it." Turner, supra note 1, at 553. It is true
that a vast number of people can be named as part of the JCE, but it is not what usually
happened.
155 See infra Section III.C.
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hierarchical nature of the crimes,'5 6 the frequency of the use of
JCE and the size of the alleged JCEs seem reasonable.
JCE was used more often against senior accused (r = .45).
There were also moderate correlations between the number of
people alleged to have been killed (r = .40) and the total number of
crime sites listed in the indictment (r =.41) and the use of JCE. In
other words, JCE appears to have been used in situations where
senior accused were charged with a large number of deaths that
occurred at a number of different crime sites, which is what one
would expect if JCE were being used to capture the criminality of
groups of individuals who act in concert to accomplish a criminal
plan or purpose.'57 This is what one would expect from a court
that was conducting predominantly legal trials.
There were weak correlations between the number of counts of
genocide and crimes against humanity and the use of JCE (r = .30
for both). There was no correlation between either the total
number of counts charged (r = .09) or the number of war crimes
charged (r = -.07) and the use of JCE. There was also no
correlation between the use of JCE and the sentence received
(r = .06). In other words, the allegation that an accused
participated in a JCE does not appear to have lengthened the
resulting sentence. In that sense, there is little support for the
claim that JCE effectively acts as a form of strict liability."'
Indeed, it actually decreased the likelihood of conviction.'5 9
Unfortunately, the data does not permit an evaluation of claims
that the prosecution often alleges JCE without sufficient clarity. 160
Superior responsibility was alleged 96 times at the ICTY.
While superior responsibility has its origins in international
156 See supra note 91.
157 See Prosecutor v. Vasiljevid, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, T$ 94-101 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 25, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/vasiljevic/acjug/en/val-aj040225e.pdf. See also supra note
91. But see Turner, supra note 1, at 562 (raising concerns about the use of JCE in
situations where the crimes that were allegedly committed are geographically remote
from the accused).
158 Turner, supra note 1, at 562-63; Ambos, supra note 91, at 174.
159 See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
160 See, e.g., Powles, supra note 152, at 618 (arguing that the prosecution on several
occasions failed to plead JCE properly due to lack of sufficient clarity); Turner, supra
note 1, at 563.
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humanitarian law and was historically applied against military
commanders,'6 1 at the ICTY it was used more often against
politicians (81% of the time) than against military personnel
(69%). This is probably a function of the seniority structure of the
accused.16 2  There was a strong correlation (r = .59) between
seniority and the use of superior responsibility. Consistent with its
legal requirements, 6 1 superior responsibility was used primarily
against those who were alleged to be in positions of authority that
permitted them to control the actions of subordinates.
Alleging superior responsibility had a weak correlation with
the total number of crime sites listed in the indictment (r = .30). It
had a barely significant correlation with the total number of counts
alleged (r = .20), and no correlation with the number of people
alleged to have been killed (r = .04) or the sentence (r = -.01).
Alleging superior responsibility as a mode of liability does not
appear to have affected the outcome of the cases, and there is little
support for the claim that superior responsibility functions as a
form of strict liability.16 4
Finally, there was only a weak correlation between the use of
superior responsibility and JCE (r = .32) and, as noted above, JCE
was used the least of all the forms of liability. Despite the fact that
both superior responsibility and JCE had fairly strong correlations
with seniority, they were nonetheless only weakly correlated with
each other. This is evidence that the Prosecutor did not use them
indiscriminately. If the Prosecutor had been using them
indiscriminately, one would expect them to have both been used
against nearly all of the senior indictees. On the other hand,
planning and aiding and abetting do appear to have been used
161 Prosecutor v. Halilovid, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Trial Judgment, 42-49 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2005), http://www.icty.org/
x/cases/halilovic/tjug/en/tcj051116e.pdf (discussing examples of, and providing
background information on, the concept of superior responsibility).
162 The military indictees included a number of low-ranking soldiers, while the
politicians tended to be higher ranking. See supra Section I.B. Thus, it follows that
superior responsibility would be used more frequently against the political figures.
163 See Prosecutor v. Orid, Case No. IT-03-68-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 18
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 3, 2008), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
oric/acjug/en/080703.pdf (listing the elements of superior responsibility as a mode of
liability).
164 See Turner, supra note 1, at 564-65 (explaining defense attorneys' concerns that
superior responsibility functions as a form of strict liability).
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somewhat indiscriminately. This practice does not, however,
appear to have been the subject of much criticism.
C. The Scope and Gravity of the Alleged Crimes
1. Gravity
The indictments were coded for the gravity of the alleged
crimes. Gravity was measured by three variables: (1) the number
of individuals alleged to have been unlawfully killed, (2) the
number of individuals alleged to have been unlawfully
imprisoned, and (3) the number of individuals alleged to have
been forcibly transferred or deported.' These three variables do
not perfectly measure the concept of gravity.166 Yet they do serve
as a useful, if somewhat imprecise, way of quantifying the
seriousness of the crimes that were alleged.
Of the 161 indictees, at least 120 were specifically alleged to
have committed crimes that involved the deaths of one or more
people. Due to ambiguities in the language of the indictments, the
actual number of accused who have been charged with committing
crimes that involved unlawful deaths may be significantly
higher. 167  The number of unlawful deaths alleged varied
considerably. The accused were alleged to have killed a single
individual 6 times. In contrast, 61 indictments specifically alleged
that the accused were responsible for the deaths of more than 100
people. Of those, 20 cases involved charges of causing more than
1,000 deaths. The median number of people alleged to have been
killed by an accused is 141. These figures almost certainly
underrepresent the actual number of people the prosecution
intended to prove had been killed by the accused. 168
165 Id.
166 See generally Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the
International Criminal Court, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1400 (2009) (discussing
extensively the concept of gravity within international criminal law).
167 Only 12 indictments clearly did not involve the death of a human being. The
remaining 29 indictments were too vague to be certain whether the prosecution intended
to try to prove at trial that the accused was criminally responsible for causing the death
of another. Although almost all of the indictments reference unlawful killings, it is
sometimes hard to tell whether the reference is intended as background material or a
specific allegation against the accused.
168 This is partly the result of a tendency on the part of the prosecution not to
provide specific numbers. Thus many indictments say things like "many people were
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Of the accused, 71 were charged with the forcible transfer or
deportation of civilians. While there were some cases that
involved a relatively small number of individuals, the majority
(53) involved the forcible transfer of thousands of civilians.
Unlawful imprisonment was also a hallmark of the conflict in the
Balkans, and 55 of the accused were charged with unlawfully
imprisoning people. Of these, 28 were charged with unlawfully
imprisoning more than 1,000 people. Thus, it seems that
individual killings could result in an indictment before the ICTY,
but that individuals were not usually indicted for forcible transfer
or unlawful imprisonment unless there were a large number of
victims. This suggests that the prosecutors believed there is a
hierarchy among the physical acts, with killings being of more
concern than forcible transfer or unlawful imprisonment. It
appears that this implicit hierarchy is shared by the judges, as the
sentences also reflect it.169
There was a barely significant correlation between the number
of people alleged to have been killed and the sentence (r = .2) and
no correlations between the sentence and the number allegedly
forcibly transported (r = .11) or imprisoned (r = .0). Again, it does
not appear that the trial outcome is predetermined by the
allegations in the indictment.
2. Scope
The indictments were coded to record two variables related to
scope: (1) the geographic scope of the alleged crimes and (2) the
number of distinct crime sites alleged in the indictment. The
geographic scope of the alleged crimes varied considerably among
the indictments and was measured on a six-point scale that ran
from a single location at one end, to crimes that took place across
multiple countries at the other. For the number of crime sites,
each separate location described in the indictment at which a crime
killed" or "a large number of detainees died as a result of the conditions." It was
impossible to code this language as a specific number of people killed. The problem was
made worse by documents filed under seal. In a number of indictments, the exact
number of dead being alleged is contained in a separate "Schedule" that is not public.
As a result, the data collected for the number of people alleged to have been killed
appears systematically to undercount the number of victims.
169 See Hold et al., supra note 20, at 424-27 (noting that ICTY sentencing practices
exhibit a hierarchy among the crimes).
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was alleged to have been committed was treated as a crime site.
Geographic scope will be addressed first. There were 21
accused charged with crimes that occurred at a single location,
such as a house or factory. Some of the indictments that involved
a single location were, nevertheless, very serious. For example,
Darko Mrda was accused of the systematic murder of more than
200 military age non-Serb men at a single location.'70 There were
28 charged with crimes that took place within a single village or
town, 35 charged with crimes that took place across an entire
municipality, and 53 charged with crimes that took place in more
than one municipality but not across an entire country."' Finally,
9 accused were charged with crimes that took place across an
entire country, and 4 accused, including Slobodan Miloievid, were
charged with crimes that took place in more than one country.
These results are summarized below in Table 3.
Table 3-Geographic Scope of Alleged Crimes
Single location 14%
Village or town 19%
Municipality 23%
More than one municipality 35%
Country 6%
More than one country 3%
Unsurprisingly, there was a strong correlation between the
seniority of the accused and the geographic extent of the crime
sites (r = .68). There was also a moderate, negative correlation
(r = -.48) between the geographic scope of the crime sites in the
indictment and whether the accused was charged as a direct
perpetrator. In other words, direct perpetrators were charged with
170 See Prosecutor v. Darko Mrda, Case No. IT-02-59-1, Indictment, 1 16 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 16, 2002), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mrdal
ind/en/mrd-ii020416.pdf.
171 For purposes of this variable, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, and Kosovo
were considered to be separate countries, but the ethnic enclaves, like Serbian Krajina,
were not.
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crimes that occurred over smaller areas, while more senior accused
were charged with crimes that occurred over larger areas.17 2 There
was no correlation between the geographic scope of the crime sites
and the sentence (r = .16).
The number of sites at which crimes were alleged to have
occurred varied greatly across indictments. The median charged
included crimes at 5 crime sites,"' but 13 accused were charged
with crimes that occurred at more than 100 crime sites. For
example, Mom6ilo Krajignik and Biljana Plavgi, both senior
Bosnian Serb politicians, were charged in connection with 499
crime sites across 37 municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Slobodan Milogevid was charged with crimes occurring at 435
crime sites in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.
There was a moderate correlation (r = .42) between the number of
crime sites and the geographic scope of the crimes, demonstrating
that the accused charged with crimes at the largest number of
crimes sites tended to be charged with crimes of broad geographic
scope.
There was no correlation between the number of crime sites
listed in the indictment and the eventual sentence (r = .13). Just as
including many counts in the indictment did not affect the
sentence, neither did alleging that crimes took place at many
different places. Once again, these findings are consistent with
ICTY trials being predominantly legal trials rather than structural
show trials.
V. Disposition of the Cases
Indictments against 21 of the 161 accused were subsequently
withdrawn-15 because the indictees were deemed not important
enough to warrant prosecution by the ICTY and 6 because the
OTP conceded there was insufficient evidence to maintain the
172 There were similar, albeit weaker, correlations between seniority and the
number of crimes sites (r = .45) and between direct perpetrators and the number of crime
sites (r = -.34).
173 The median is used here rather than the average because the average is strongly
influenced by a few outliers, including the 499 crime sites alleged in the indictment of
Mom6ilo Krajignik and Biljana Plavgid. The average number of crime sites was almost
31, even though less than 25% of the indictees were charged with crimes occurring at 31
or more crime sites.
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indictment.'74 This leaves 140 people for whom the indictments
were not withdrawn. Of these 140 accused, 7 died before they
could be transferred to the ICTY, and 13 were subsequently
transferred back to domestic courts in the former Yugoslavia for
prosecution.' Another 4 individuals died after appearing at the
ICTY but before their trials began. That leaves 116 individuals
who have been tried or will be tried. Of those 116 people, 4 died
during their trials, including Slobodan Milogevid.
Guilty pleas were entered by 20 accused, and 5 of them were
given after a partial trial. The most significant guilty pleas came
from Biljana Plavi6,17 6 who had been the Co-President of the
Bosnian Serb Republic (later the Republika Srpska) and Milan
Babid, the President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Guilty
pleas at the ICTY are far less common than they are in
prosecutions in the United States. So far, 19% of those who have
had a trial (20 of 104) have pled guilty at the ICTY. By
comparison, 94% of domestic prosecutions that reach the trial
stage at the state level in the United States are resolved with a
guilty plea.' 7 At the federal level, 97% of accused plead guilty.'78
On the other hand, plea bargains and guilty pleas are virtually
unknown in Europe, particularly in countries that use an
inquisitorial system.17 9 There is an ongoing debate about the
wisdom of permitting guilty pleas at international criminal
174 In addition, 17 investigative dossiers, involving 43 individuals believed to have
committed violations of international criminal law, were transferred to national courts
before an indictment was filed. See U.N. Secretary-General, Budget for the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
since 1991, for the Biennium 2012-2013 14, U.N. Doc. A/66/386 (Sept. 29, 2011),
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=A/66/386. These dossiers contained
the results of investigations by the OTP that produced evidence of crimes but for which
an ICTY indictment was never confirmed. Id.
175 These transfers resulted in 11 convictions with sentences ranging from 7 to 34
years, I acquittal, and I trial that has not yet been completed.
176 Ford, supra note 4, at 473-74 (discussing Plavgi's "dramatic courtroom
confession").
177 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 74, fig. 1, at 1.
178 See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS fig.C, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research-andStatistics/Annual
Reports andSourcebooks/201 1/FigureC.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2013).
179 See Tonry, supra note 143, at 21.
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courts. 80
While 84 individuals pled not guilty and received full trials,
there were not 84 separate trials. Many of the accused were tried
together. As a result, there have been only 38 full trials before the
ICTY. At the time that work on the database was completed (May
3, 2012), 56 individuals had completely exhausted their appeals, I
had died after entry of a trial judgment but before completion of
the appeal, 17 individuals were in the midst of an appeal, 7
individuals had completed their trials but were awaiting a trial
judgment,18 ' and 3 individuals, who were being tried together in
Case No. IT-04-84 (Haradinaj et al.),182 were in the midst of a
retrial ordered by the Appeals Chamber.
In addition, 2 individuals, Ratko Mladid, Commander of the
Bosnian Serb Army (VRS), and Goran Had2ii, former President
of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina, had appeared before the
tribunal, but their trials had not yet begun. Lastly, 6 individuals
were in the midst of their trials, including Radovan Karadi, the
former President of the Republika Srpska. The results are
summarized below in Table 4.
Table 4 - The Disposition of the Accused's Cases
Prosecution withdrawn 13%
Died before transfer to the ICTY 4%
Transferred back to domestic courts 8%
Died before trial began 2%
180 See Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary
Crimes, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 683, 702-03 (2007) (arguing that guilty pleas are
consistent with the purposes of international tribunals, including promoting efficiency
and reconciliation). But see Ford, supra note 4, at 473 (arguing that most confessions
lack sufficient detail and a clear acceptance of responsibility and are therefore of limited
use in fostering reconciliation).
181 This includes the six individuals charged together in Case No. IT-04-74-T. See
Prosecutor v. Prlid, Case No. IT-04-74-T, Judgment, 1 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia May 29, 2013), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/tjug/en/130529 summary
en.pdf.
182 That retrial has now finished, see supra note 15, but the results are not included
in the analysis because they occurred after the database was completed.
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Died during trial 2%
Trial completed 65%
Trial underway 4%
Awaiting trial 1%
The numbers in Table 4 are generally consistent with global
trends. In the United States, approximately 30% of felony
defendants never reach an adjudication, and the remaining 70%
receive a judgment, although the vast majority of these judgments
are the result of plea bargains rather than trials."' Overall, 71% of
those charged with murder across all criminal justice systems are
eventually convicted.18 4  While some of these individuals are
acquitted, many of the charges are dropped before trial for reasons
other than an acquittal, including technical, evidentiary, or policy
reasons.' In short, the rate accused go to trial appears to be
roughly equivalent at the ICTY, in the U.S., and within other
domestic jurisdictions. On the other hand, there is some evidence
that the rate at which at which accused go to trial in Europe is
higher than at the ICTY or in the United States.'8 6
A. Conviction Rate
Of the 97 individuals for whom a first trial judgment had been
issued (as of May 3, 2012), 11 were acquitted at the trial stage,
yielding a conviction rate of 89%.'" In addition, although data
was not collected on partial acquittals (i.e., where the defendant
succeeds in defeating some, but not all, of the charges), it appears
that they are quite common."' This conviction rate is lower than
183 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 74, fig.1, at 1.
184 See INTERNATIONAL STATISTICS ON CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 92.
185 Id. at 91.
186 Id. at 92. See also AEBI ET AL., supra note 76, tbls. 2.2.1.6, 2.2.1.7, at 139-40
(showing rates at which criminal cases in Europe are dismissed for legal, factual, policy,
or efficiency reasons).
187 Of the 11 initial acquittals, 2 were subsequently overturned on appeal and
remanded for a retrial. At the same time, 4 individuals were acquitted on appeal who
had been convicted at trial. The ultimate conviction rate cannot be known until all of the
trials and appeals are exhausted.
188 Turner, supra note 1, at 586-87 ("At the ICTY, as of April 12, 2005, defendants
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the conviction rate for felony defendants in the United States.'89 It
is also lower than comparable rates in France or Germany.' 90 The
relatively low conviction rate at the ICTY relative to domestic
systems undermines the arguments of a minority of defense
attorneys who believe that obtaining acquittals is "practically
impossible.""' Rather, it appears that defense attorneys have a
greater likelihood of securing an acquittal at the ICTY than in
domestic jurisdictions.'9 2 The higher acquittal rate at the ICTY
may reflect the fact that the ICTY's cases are more legally and
factually complex than the average domestic case, because they
include more crimes, more victims, more crime sites, more
participants, and more complicated theories about criminal
responsibility. The additional complexity of trials at the ICTY
presumably produces more places where the accused can try to
introduce a reasonable doubt about the prosecution's case.
Particularly in the case of accuseds identified as Kosovar
Albanians, the low conviction rates may also be the result of
politically-motivated charging decisions by the Prosecutor.19 3
Those who have been acquitted include prominent Serbs like
Milan Milutinovi6,' 94 the former President of Serbia; prominent
Croatians, like Ivan Cermak,19 5 a former Assistant Minister of
Defence in the Croatian government; and prominent Bosniaks, like
Sefer Halilovid,"' the Chief of the Command Staff of the Army of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The relatively high acquittal rate
compared to domestic jurisdictions is inconsistent with the theory
that conviction is assured and that the trials themselves are simply
were acquitted of 206 counts out of a total of 475 counts confirmed by the trial
chambers.").
189 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 74, fig. 1, at I (showing that of
69 felony defendants who get to the trial stage, on average 68 (98%) are convicted).
190 Turner, supra note 1, at 585-86.
191 Id. at 550.
192 Id. at 55 1.
193 See infra Section V.B.
194 See Press Release, The Hague, Five Senior Serb Officials Convicted of Kosovo
Crimes, One Acquitted (Feb. 26, 2009), http://www.icty.org/sid/10070 (Milutinovid).
195 See Press Release, The Hague, Appeals Chamber affirms acquittal of Sefer
Halilovid (Oct. 16, 2007), http://www.icty.org/sid/8830 (Halilovid).
196 See Press Release, The Hague, Tribunal Convicts Gotovina and Markaz,
Acquits 4iermak (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.icty.org/sid/10633 (eermak).
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for show.'9 Similarly, the fact that senior individuals from each
of the ethnic groups have been acquitted is also inconsistent with
claims that the trials are predominantly political in nature.
B. Acquittals
While this Article has generally explored the connection
between sentence length and various characteristics of the
indictments, this is not the only way to test for structural show
trials. Another way to look at whether the content of the
indictments control the outcomes is to look at correlations between
the characteristics of the indictments and conviction or acquittal.
There was no significant correlation (i.e., Irl < .2)198 between
conviction and the age, role, or seniority of the accused.
Similarly, there was no significant correlation between conviction
and the number of counts, the number of crime sites, or the
geographic extent of the crime sites alleged in the indictment.
Finally, neither alleging genocide, nor using superior
responsibility as a mode of liability, had a statistically significant
correlation with conviction or acquittal.
One factor that has a significant association with conviction is
the use of JCE as a mode of liability. The correlation, however, is
both weak and negative (r = -.22). In other words, alleging the
existence of a JCE in the indictment did correlate with
convictions, if only weakly, but it made conviction less likely, not
more likely. This may be because proving the existence of a JCE
is factually and legally complex 99 and is thus more difficult to
establish than other modes of liability, like direct commission,
197 See Peterson, supra note 1, at 260-61 (noting that the near certainty of
conviction is the hallmark of a show trial, while non-show trials are marked by the
possibility that the accused can secure his or her freedom).
198 See supra note 86 (explaining the determination of statistical correlation).
199 For example, one of the requirements of JCE is that the prosecution must show
that all of the alleged members of the JCE shared the intent to pursue some course of
action that was either itself a crime or necessarily involved the commission of one or
more crimes. See Vasiljevid, supra note 157 (stating the elements of JCE, including the
requirement that there be proof of a common criminal purpose amongst a plurality of
people); Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 262
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/brdanin/tjug/en/brd-tj040901 e.pdf ("A common plan amounting to or involving an
understanding or an agreement between two or more persons that they will commit a
crime must be proved.").
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ordering, or instigating. In any event, the negative correlation
between the use of JCE and convictions is inconsistent with claims
that JCE acts as a form of strict liability.20 0
Ethnicity, on the other hand, was once again an area where
there were significant differences. As noted above in Section
III.C, ethnic Serbs make up the largest number of indictees at the
ICTY. They also had a higher conviction rate than other
ethnicities. Table 5 below summarizes the results. One possible
explanation is that the notably lower conviction rates for Bosniaks
and Kosovar Albanians are due to, the fact that charges against
these two groups were, on the whole, weaker than the charges
against the Croats and Serbs. Weaker cases presumably would
lead to higher acquittal rates if the trials were fundamentally legal
in nature.20'
Table 5 - Conviction Rates by Ethnicity
Ethnicity Convicted Conviction Rate
Serb 60 of 62 97%
Croat 16 of 18 89%
Bosniak 4 of 6 67%
Kosovar Albanian 2 of 6 33%
There is some support for this in the extrinsic evidence. The
ICTY was acutely aware of the criticism it faced among ethnic
Serbs for being allegedly anti-Serb.2 02 Yet, at the same time, the
vast majority of crimes were committed by ethnic Serbs. 203 As
200 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (offering an explanation of how
the trials were fair).
202 See The Human Rights Center et al., Justice, Accountability and Social
Reconstruction: An Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and Prosecutors, 18 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 102, 110-11 (2000) (noting that, by at least 1997, the ICTY was aware of its
negative perception within the Balkans and took purposeful steps, including creating an
official outreach program, to improve this perception); Ctd, supra note 63, at 176
(noting that indictments of senior ethnic Croats were publicized prior to the Dayton
Accords as a means to try to defuse accusations of anti-Serb bias).
203 See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
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Professor Greenawalt has suggested, if the Prosecutor had made
choices solely based on the gravity of the crimes, the ICTY might
well have prosecuted only Serbs. 20 But the Prosecutor was under
immense pressure to indict at least some people from all of the
sides. 205
The result was that politically-motivated but arguably weak
cases were pursued against Bosniaks and Kosovar Albanians, in an
attempt to appear impartial. 206  A disproportionate percentage of
these cases ended with acquittals. If this is true, then the lower
conviction rates for Bosniaks and Kosovar Albanians are evidence
that the Prosecutor engaged in politically-motivated indictments.207
While lawyers might normally be expected to argue that
politically-motivated indictments are a bad idea, Professor
Greenawalt argues that the Prosecutor was correct to launch cases
against members of all sides in the conflict, even if not all of the
cases were of the same caliber.208  He claims that charging only
ethnic Serbs would have been "deeply unfortunate, however fair-
minded the principles that produced"20 9 such a strategy, because it
204 Greenawalt, supra note 102, at 648.
205 See C6t6, supra note 63, at 176 ("[I1t has become an open secret that
international Prosecutors, in selecting a potential indictee, may take into account criteria
related to their belonging to or affiliation with a certain group in order to present in court
more balanced cases involving all parties to the conflict . . . ."). See also SCHABAS, supra
note 56, at 78 ("The Serbs complained that they were bearing the brunt of the
prosecutions, while the others [Croats, Bosniaks and Kosovars] grumbled that they were
victims of a misguided attempt to make the institution look balanced.").
206 See Greenawalt, supra note 102, at 649 (noting that the OTP's prosecution
strategy was "designed to achieve the greatest amount of public legitimacy"). See also
Jean Galbraith, The Pace of International Criminal Justice, 31 MICH. J. INT'L L. 79, 92
(2009) (noting "efforts by the ICTY... to pursue indictments against members of
virtually all sides of the conflicts. This is true despite the gravity of the crimes charged
varying notably between individuals of different sides"); C6t6, supra note 63, at 173
(noting Esad Landio's challenge that the Prosecutor's office targeted him because he
was the only one they could find to "represent" his ethnicity). Cf id at 176 (noting that
indictments of senior ethnic Croats were rushed out as a way to defuse accusations of
anti-Serb bias); Danner, supra note 63, at 543-44 (noting allegations that the Prosecutor
indicted a Croatian general simply to "bring a high-ranking Croat to The Hague")
(quoting Daniel Simpson, Croatia Protects a General Charged with War Crimes: In
Rubble of Village Serb Calls for Vengeance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2002, at A 10.).
207 See Greenawalt, supra note 102, at 649 (concluding that the Prosecutor's
indictment decisions were driven in part by political considerations).
208 Id. at 648-49.
209 Id.
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would have encouraged Croats and Bosniaks to "sweep their own
crimes under the rug."210
Perhaps prosecutors may be permitted to take some political
considerations into account when determining who to charge, but
they should not allow such considerations to override their duty to
ensure that charges are only brought when there is sufficient
evidence to support a conviction.2 1' The fact that the cases against
the Bosniaks and Kosovars have failed at disproportionately high
rates suggests that the Prosecutors permitted political
considerations to take precedence over their legal duty.
The Prosecutor, not surprisingly, views things somewhat
differently. For example, after the acquittal of Ramush Haradinaj
and his Kosovar Albanian co-accused, the Prosecutor argued that
the acquittals stemmed from the failure of the court to hear from
two key witnesses who were allegedly afraid to testify because of
intimidation.2 12  The Prosecutor ultimately secured a retrial of
Haradinaj et al., on the grounds that greater efforts should have
been made to secure the testimony of the witnesses.2 13 In the
retrial, the two witnesses who had not testified in the first trial did
testify.214 The result was another acquittal.2 15 This suggests that a
weak case, not witness intimidation, was the basis for the
acquittals.
C. Sentences
For those convicted of a crime, the trial sentences ranged from
210 Id. at 649. See also C6t6, supra note 63, at 175 (suggesting that "the credibility
of [the ICTY] could not afford to be further weakened by a poor prosecutorial selection
policy of accused that would reflect only one side of the conflict in situations where
crimes were committed by all parties").
211 See U.N. Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, supra note 73, 14
("Prosecutors shall not initiate or continue prosecution, or shall make every effort to stay
proceedings, when an impartial investigation shows the charge to be unfounded.").
212 Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, TT
14-33 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 19, 2010), http://www.icty.org/
x/cases/haradinaj/acjug/en/100721.pdf.
213 Id. T 48-50.
214 Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., Case No. IT-04-84bis-T, Trial Chamber II
Judgment, 4 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2012),
http://www.icty.org/x/casesIharadinaj/tjug/en/121129judgement-en.pdf.
215 See id. 683-85.
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2 years (for Naser Orid) to 46 years (for Radislav Krstid).2 16 The
average trial sentence was 17.4 years, and the median sentence
was 16 years.217 The most commonly occurring sentence was 20
years, which was given 9 times. Figure 4 presents a histogram of
the sentences. It appears that sentences are getting longer over
time at the ICTY.
216 Krsti6 was found guilty of genocide, persecution, and murder for his
involvement in the systematic murder of at least 7,000 Bosniak men and boys following
the fall of Srebrenica. See Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 180, at 687.
217 For purposes of this calculation, it was necessary to either assign a value to a
life sentence or exclude the life sentences from the calculation. It was important to
include the life sentences; otherwise, the "average" sentence is lower than the reality of
ICTY sentencing practices. A value of 40 years was chosen. This appears to be
generally consistent with sentencing practices at international criminal courts and courts
in the United States. In Article 110(3), the Rome Statute provides that individuals who
have served two-thirds of their sentence are entitled to a review hearing. Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, art. 110, 1 3, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 38544 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The Rome Statute also specifies that this
will occur after 25 years for those sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. This implies that a
life sentence at the ICC is worth 37.5 years. Other internationalized courts have come to
similar conclusions. See Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav, Case No. 001/18-07-2007-
ECCC/SC, Appeal Judgment, IT 28-29, at 335-36 (Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia Feb. 03, 2012) (Klonowiecka-Milart, A. & Nihal Jayasinghe, C.,
partially dissenting joint opinion) http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/
courtdoc/Case%20001AppealJudgementEn.pdf; Prosecutor v. Aloys Ntabakuze, Case
No. ICTR-98-41A-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, I 315-16 (May 8, 2012). The U.S.
Sentencing Commission, in compiling its statistics on federal sentences, was faced with
the same problem and elected to treat life sentences as a sentence of 470 months, or
almost 40 years. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 178, at app. A. Finally,
the average age of the indictees at the time of commission of the crimes was 40.
According to the World Health Organization, the average life expectancy for men in
Bosnia and Herzegovina is 74. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA, http://www.who.int/countries/bih/en/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2013). Thus, a
40 year sentence is indeed a "life sentence" for the majority of ICTY indictees. But see
HolI et al., supra note 119, at 89; Hold et al., supra note 20, at 414 (arguing that a value
of 55 years for life sentences "arguably expresses the specific quality of a life sentence
as the severest sentence").
218 Hold et al., supra note 119, at 89 (noting, based on data through August 2008,
that the average trial sentence was 15.9 years and the median sentence was 15 years).
While it is possible that the calculus of sentencing is changing over time at the ICTY, it
is also possible that the later cases are simply of more gravity than earlier cases, and that
this explains the apparent lengthening of the sentences.
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Figure 4 - Sentences
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Life sentences from the trial chamber were given to 4 accused.
These have not been the most senior accused, as one might expect,
if the trials were political rather than legal. In fact, as noted above
in Section III.D, there is no correlation between seniority and the
length of sentence. Rather, all 4 are mid-level accused,
specifically a Lieutenant Colonel and a Colonel in the Bosnian
Serb Army; a municipal leader in Prijedor; and the leader of a
Bosnian Serb paramilitary group. While seniority cannot explain
these lengthy sentences, they can be explained by the gravity of
the crimes. These cases are marked by the particular brutality of
the alleged crimes. For example, Trial Chamber III found that on
two separate occasions, Milan Lukid locked large numbers of
people inside a building and then deliberately set it on fire.2 19 The
Trial Chamber found that his crimes were notable:
[F]or the viciousness of the incendiary attack, for the obvious
premeditation and calculation that defined it, for the sheer
callousness, monstrosity and brutality of herding, trapping and
locking the victims in the two houses, thereby rendering them
helpless in the ensuing inferno and for the degree of pain and
suffering inflicted on the victims as they were burnt alive.220
The only variable that has a moderate correlation with
219 Prosecutor v. Milan Lukid, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Trial Chamber III Judgment,
115-239 (Int'l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milan lukicsredoje lukic/tjug/en/090720j.pdf
220 Id. 740, at 239.
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sentence length is the number of genocide counts alleged against
the accused.22 1 The number of crimes against humanity alleged
has a very weak correlation with the eventual sentence (r = .24).
There was no correlation (i.e., Irl < .2) between sentence length
and the role of the accused, the seniority of the accused, the age of
the accused, the number of counts of war crimes alleged in the
indictment, the number of crime sites in the indictment, the
number of people alleged to have been killed, the number of
people alleged to have been deported, the number of people
alleged to have been unlawfully imprisoned, or the mode of
liability alleged. In short, there is little evidence the content of the
indictment dictates the outcomes of cases at the ICTY.222
Some have argued that ICTY sentences are not commensurate
with the crimes.22 The average ICTY indictment alleged the
unlawful killing of more than 100 hundred people, yet resulted in
an average sentence of only 17.4 years. As Harmon and Gaynor
point out, Radislav Krstid was sentenced to just 1.825 days in
prison for each of the 7,000-8,000 deaths he was found criminally
responsible for having caused, a situation they describe as
"inconsistent with any serious notion of human dignity., 224 While
there is little theoretical agreement on how to determine an
appropriate sentence, which would depend on what purposes one
assigned to international criminal justice and how those purposes
were weighted,2 25 ICTY sentencing practices are significantly less
punitive than practices in the United States. They may, however,
be closer to sentencing practices in Europe.
More than 50% of those convicted of murder in state courts in
the United States receive life sentences, and almost everyone else
receives a prison sentence longer than 10 years. 2 26 At the federal
level, murder sentences averaged almost exactly 20 years in
2011.227 The vast majority of these sentences are presumably for
221 See supra note 130.
222 See also Hold et al., supra note 119, at 95-97 (concluding there is little
correlation between the content of an indictment and the outcome of an ICTY case).
223 Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 180, at 684-87.
224 Id. at 692.
225 See Cryer, supra note 85, at 496-98 (noting that the purposes of punishment and
sentencing in international criminal law are relatively undeveloped).
226 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 75, app. tbl.10, at 27.
227 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 180, tbl.13.
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single murders. 2 28 Those accused of multiple murders in the United
States receive much harsher sentences than the statistics on
average murder sentences suggest.
For example, John Allen Muhammad, the "Beltway Sniper,"
was convicted of having shot and killed 10 people and seriously
wounding 3 others during the course of a shooting spree that took
place in Maryland and Virginia. He was tried in Maryland for
crimes committed in Maryland, where he was sentenced to 6
consecutive life terms without parole.2 2 9  He was also tried in
Virginia for crimes committed in Virginia, where he was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death.230 He was eventually
executed in Virginia. 231 Timothy McVeigh, the key figure in the
Oklahoma City bombing, was executed.232 Terry Nichols, an
accomplice in the Oklahoma City bombing, received a life
sentence in his federal trial and 161 consecutive life sentences in
his subsequent state trial.233 Other similar domestic crimes have
received equally long sentences.2 34 ICTY sentences are
significantly lower than sentences for comparable crimes in the
United States.
ICTY sentences may be more in line, however, with
sentencing practices in Europe. For one thing Europe, like the
228 See supra note 133.
229 See Urbina, supra note 141, at A14 (discussing the sentencing of John
Muhammad).
230 See Liptak, supra note 141, at A9 (reporting on the sentencing of John
Muhammad).
231 See Muhammad v. Com., 269 Va. 451, 451 (2005) (discussing John
Muhammad's crimes in Virginia); Ian Urbina, Sniper Who Killed 10 Is Executed in
Virginia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/ll/11/
us/i sniper.html (describing the execution at Greensville Correctional Center, a Virginia
state prison).
232 See Wren, supra note 137 (reporting on the prosecution's strategy in
prosecuting Timothy McVeigh).
233 See United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1999) (sentencing
Nichols to life in prison); Apologetic Nichols Is Sentenced to Life for Oklahoma
Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/10/
us/apologetic-nichols-is-sentenced-to-life-for-oklahoma-bombing.html (reporting on
Nichols sentencing).
234 See Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 180, at 686-87 (discussing the differences in
guilty pleas in terms of sentencing); F. Santos, Tucson Case Comes to End With Plea by
Gunman, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2012, at A9.
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ICTY, does not permit the death penalty.23 5 In addition, sentences
for very serious crimes are shorter in Europe than in the United
States. The average sentence for an intentional homicide in
Europe is 90 months,236 or slightly more than 7.5 years. This is
significantly lower than the average murder sentences handed
down in the United States. In general, European criminal justice
systems appear to be among the least punitive in the world.237
These differences persist in some countries when one looks at
mass killings. For example, one of the most serious crimes to
occur in Europe in recent years took place in Norway, where
extremist Anders Behring Breivik killed 77 people and wounded
many more.238 He ultimately ended up being sentenced to 21 years
imprisonment.2 39 On the other hand, some of those convicted of
participating in the Madrid train bombings in March 2004 received
sentences as high as 43,000 years.24 0
Extremely long prison sentences are, of course, symbolic.
Terry Nichols is not actually going to spend 161 consecutive life
terms in prison any more than the Madrid train bombers are going
to spend the next 43,000 years in prison. Yet, some countries, like
the United States and Spain, clearly believe that such symbolic
sentencing is necessary to adequately express society's
condemnation of the crimes. Not all countries adopt this practice,
however, and Norway limits sentences to 21 years. 24 ' The ICTY
has eschewed symbolic sentencing in favor of a practice that looks
235 See Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in All
Circumstances, Feb. 21 2002, 41 I.L.M. 515 (2002) (banning the death penalty in all
European states).
236 See AEBI ET AL., supra note 76, tbl.3.2.5.3, at 257 (indicating that the average
sentence for intentional homicide in Europe is 90.5 months and the median sentence is
85.5 months).
237 See Harrendorf et al., supra note 77, at 132 (discussing details of European
criminal sentencing).
238 Mark Lewis & Sarah Lyall, Norwegian Mass Killer Gets Maximum Sentence:
21 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2012, at A3.
239 See id.
240 See Victoria Burnett, Convictions and Key Acquittals End Madrid Bomb Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2007 (reporting on the varied convictions decided by the National
Court of suspects in the 2004 Madrid train bombings).
241 See Lewis & Lyall, supra note 238, at A3 (discussing the sentencing of Anders
Behring Breivik, who received the maximum sentence in Norway of 21 years).
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much more like the model used in Norway than that used in the
United States. As with charging practices,242 ICTY sentencing
practices fall within the range of sentencing practices found in
domestic criminal justice systems.
D. Guilty Pleas
The use of guilty pleas has had a modest effect on the average
sentences. The average sentence of those who pled guilty is 14.3
years; the average sentence of those who did not plead guilty is
18.3 years. In other words, those who have pled guilty have, on
average, received sentences four years shorter than those who
went to trial and were found guilty. 243 This apparently contradicts
earlier findings that guilty pleas did not significantly affect the
sentence.2 44 This leniency towards those who pled guilty is
probably partly because a guilty plea is considered a mitigating
factor at sentencing.2 45  But it may also be partly because the
charges against those who pled guilty were different from the
charges against those who did not plead guilty. The results of a
comparison of those who pled guilty compared to those who were
found guilty after a trial are presented below in Table 6.246
242 See supra notes 143-149 and accompanying text.
243 Guilty pleas occurred infrequently, however, and the effect was to reduce the
overall average sentence by slightly less than one year to 17.4 years.
244 See Hold et al., supra note 119, at 91 ("However, the difference between the
sentence of those pleading guilty and those not doing so is minimal.").
245 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milan Babid, Case No. IT-03-72-S, Sentencing
Judgment, 1 68 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 29, 2004) ("The Trial
Chamber accepts the parties' arguments that the case-law of the Tribunal has
consistently considered a guilty plea as a mitigating factor.").
246 The values reported for sentence, seniority, age, number of deaths, and total
counts are averages. The result reported for number of crime sites is the median because
a single outlier dominated the average result.
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Table 6 - Comparison of Guilty Pleas to Trial Convictions
Guilty Plea Trial Conviction
Sentence 14.3 years 18.3 years
Seniority 3.9 4.9
Age 35.9 41.3
Prison Camp Personnel 35% 15%
No. of Crime Sites (median) 3 10
Number of Deaths 1,012 1,556
Total Counts 10.7 11.6
Charged using JCE 25% 45%
Charged as Direct Perpetrator 60% 39%
Geographic Scope of Charges Town Municipal
Those who pled guilty were indeed different from those who
were tried. For one thing, they were younger, less senior in the
hierarchy, and more of them were prison camp personnel. More
importantly, they were charged with fewer counts, at fewer sites,
within a smaller geographic area. They were also alleged to be
responsible for fewer deaths.24 7 In addition, they were less likely
to have been charged under a theory of JCE and more likely to
have been charged as direct perpetrators of violence. In short, it
appears that those who pled guilty were largely the "small fish,"
with Biljana Plav§i's guilty plea248 being the obvious exception to
that conclusion. The comparison above suggests that at least part
of the reason that people who pled guilty received lighter
sentences is because they were generally charged with fewer, less
serious offenses.
247 As noted above, this conclusion should be treated carefully because data on the
number of deaths was not available for all of the accused. See supra note 167 and
accompanying text.
248 See supra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing Plav§i's "confession").
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E. Appeals
The ICTY Appeals Chamber has the power to change the
sentence of the accused.24 9  Thus, the numbers look a little
different on appeal. The Appeals Chamber reduced the sentence
20 times, affirmed the trial sentence 28 times, and only increased
the sentence 4 times. The average result was a decrease in the trial
sentence of 1.6 years. This suggests that, all other things being
equal, appealing the trial chamber judgment is usually a good
idea.250 Of those who were convicted of crimes by the court, 44
have completed their sentences and have been released already.25 '
The actions of the Appeals Chamber also suggest that the
ICTY's trials are not structural show trials. If they were, one
would not expect the trial decision to be overturned on appeal.
Yet on 4 occasions in the dataset, the Appeals Chamber has
acquitted an accused convicted by the Trial Chamber. In addition,
in a recent decision that is not part of the dataset, the Appeals
Chamber acquitted Croatians Ante Gotovina and Mladen
Marka6.2 52 The Appeals Chamber in Gotovina & Markaj was
deeply divided, with 2 of the 5 judges filing strongly worded
dissents, and 2 of those in the majority feeling compelled to file
separate opinions.2 53  This level of division within the Appeals
Chamber is inconsistent with the idea that the trials are show trials
that rubber-stamp the allegations in the indictments.
249 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, 266-75 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/acjug/en/krs-aj040419e.pdf (reducing Krsti6's
sentence from 46 years to 35 years).
250 See also HolA et al., supra note 119, at 89 (noting that "[fin the majority of cases
sentences issued by the trial chambers are either confirmed or reduced on appeal").
251 See ICTY, KEY FIGURES, available at http://icty.org/x/file/Cases/keyfigures
/keyfigures en.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2013) (providing figures on the current status of
those serving their sentences, including 44 who have completed their sentences).
252 See Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina & Mladen Marka6, Case No. IT-06-90-A,
Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16,
2012), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/acjug/en/121116judgement.pdf (issuing
acquittals on certain grounds of appeal).
253 See id. at sect. VIII, 1 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Carmel Agius) (Judge
Agius wrote that he "strongly disagree[d] with almost all of the conclusions reached by
the Majority .... ); see also id. at sect. X, 39 (Judge Pocar described the majority
opinion as "contradict[ing] any sense ofjustice.").
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F. The Typical ICTY Accused
The typical ICTY accused was a 40-year old male. He was a
soldier, ethnically Serb, and worked in the command staff of a
brigade or battalion sized unit. He was charged with 4 war crimes
and 4 crimes against humanity, but not genocide. The indictment
alleges a variety of modes of liability, including planning,
instigating, ordering, and superior responsibility. He was also
charged in the alternative as an aider and abettor. He was alleged
to have participated in the unlawful killing of more than 100
people that took place in multiple locations within a single
municipality. It is possible, although not probable, that he was
also charged with having forcibly transported or deported more
than a 1,000 people. His case went to trial, and he was convicted.
He was sentenced to 20 years in prison by the Trial Chamber and
that sentence was affirmed on appeal by the Appeals Chamber.
Perhaps surprisingly, given the seriousness of the charges, he is
due to be released soon.
It is worth noting that the average prosecution at the ICTY
alleged crimes roughly on par with some of the worst crimes
prosecuted in domestic systems. For example, Timothy McVeigh
was accused of killing 168 people when he blew up the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.2 54 The recent trial of
Anders Breivik in Norway involved allegations of having killed 77
people. 2 55 The Madrid train bombings alleged the deaths of 192
people.2 56 These trials were viewed as landmarks in their
respective countries that dealt with crimes far beyond those
normally handled by the domestic criminal justice system. 25 7 Yet
they would have been average cases at the ICTY. None of them is
comparable to the gravity of what occurred at Srebrenica, where
more than 7,000 young men and boys were systematically
murdered in the space of a few days.2 58
254 See Romano & Kenworthy, supra note 136 (reporting on the prosecutor's case
against Timothy McVeigh, including the subsequent sentencing).
255 See Lewis & Lyall, supra note 238 (reporting on the sentencing of Anders
Breivik).
256 See Sciolino, supra note 147 (detailing the Madrid train bombings in 2004).
257 See supra note 133 and accompanying text (arguing that the vast majority of
murder trials in domestic systems involve a single victim).
258 See Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment f 53-84
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001) (describing the execution of
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VI. Conclusion
ICTY trials are not structural show trials. There are no strong
correlations between the contents of the indictments and the
convictions or sentences. Age, seniority, the number of counts in
the indictment, the modes of liability alleged, the number of crime
sites in the indictment, and the accused's role do not appear to
have significantly affected the sentence. The only factor that has a
moderate correlation with the sentence is a charge of genocide, but
that can be best explained by the effect of being found guilty of
genocide.25 9
Moreover, many of the common criticisms of ICTY trials are
not supported by the evidence. Neither the use of JCE nor
superior responsibility was positively correlated with sentence
length or conviction. In fact, JCE was weakly correlated with
being acquitted, not convicted. Thus, there is little evidence that
these modes of liability act as forms of strict liability. Further,
conviction rates at the ICTY are lower than for comparable crimes
in domestic criminal justice systems, undermining claims that it is
disproportionately difficult to obtain an acquittal at the ICTY.
One issue that deserves further consideration is the ethnic
composition of the accused. Ethnic Serbs were more likely to be
indicted by the ICTY and received longer average sentences than
ethnic Bosniaks. While this seems troubling at first glance, there
is no reason to assume that members of different groups should be
charged equally or sentenced to similar terms. Rather, the
evidence suggests that it was appropriate to charge more ethnic
Serbs than any other group and give them longer sentences
because ethnic Serbs were responsible for more numerous and
more serious crimes.
In general, the indictments appear to be consistent with what
one would expect from a court principally concerned with
adjudicating guilt through fair procedures. The indictments
largely comply with the requirements of international criminal
law, are internally consistent, and match what we know about the
ways in which serious violations of international criminal law are
committed. More generally, ICTY charging and sentencing
more than 7,000 Bosniak men and boys by Serbian forces under the control of Radislav
Krstic).
259 See supra notes 130-132 and accompanying text.
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practices fall within the range of practices found in domestic
criminal justice systems that are widely considered to be fair.
There are a few problems, including that certain modes of
liability are used somewhat indiscriminately and that a number of
indictments were vague about the number of victims. Some
uncertainty is to be expected and does not necessarily indicate a
problem.2 60  But, in a few cases it was hard to tell whether the
prosecution believed the accused was responsible for any
deaths.2 6 1 This is problematic. The accused is entitled to know the
charges against him or her.2 62 These problems were not pervasive,
however. On the whole, there is little evidence of systematic
unfairness in the indictments.
For these reasons, this articles' central finding is that the
evidence from the indictments and trials supports the conclusion
that ICTY trials are fundamentally fair. In essence, the ICTY has
successfully threaded the needle of pursuing consequentialist
goals, like settling the historical record and promoting peace and
reconciliation, while retaining predominantly legal trials.
Ultimately, this finding largely agrees with Professor Turner's
conclusions in her article, which were based on qualitative
interviews with defense attorneys.26 3 Conclusions in this Article
are the result of an empirical analysis of the indictments, and the
fact that these two different methodologies reach similar
conclusions provides some reassurance about the robustness of the
260 See Chile Eboe-Osuji, "Vague" Indictments and Justice at the International
Criminal Tribunals: Learning from the World of Common Law, in BRITISH AND
CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 105, 109 (Christopher P.M. Waters
ed. 2006).
261 See, e.g., id. at 108 (noting the judge's confusion over the prosecution's
argument).
262 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(3)(a), Mar. 23,
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (stating that any person charged with a crime has the right to be
"informed promptly and in detail .. . of the nature and cause of the charge against him").
263 See Turner, supra note 1, at 582-93 (stating that many defense attorneys
consider "international criminal trials as genuine factual and legal contests . . . ."). See
also David Wippman, The Cost of International Justice, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 861, 878-80
(2006) ("For the most part, the ICTY seems to have succeeded in conducting credible
trials while simultaneously developing a large body of case law of generally high
quality."); Stromseth, supra note 10, at 267-68 (stating that the ICTY has "brought to
justice, in fair trials, at least some of the individuals most responsible for egregious
atrocities").
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finding.
If we expand our focus to look beyond the trials, however, the
picture is less clear. It is undisputed that the ICTY was created to
pursue political goals in addition to legal ones. More troubling is
the selectivity of the Security Council's decisions. Why did
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia receive international tribunals
while other countries that had experienced serious violations of
international criminal law did not receive any judicial body? This
selectivity may be legally defensible, as the Security Council is an
inherently political body, but it is also an unfortunate feature of
many international criminal justice mechanisms. It would be
preferable if the availability of a forum for adjudicating serious
violations of international criminal law did not rely on the political
decisions of the Security Council, particularly as the Security
Council is often hamstrung by the permanent member veto.
To some extent, this concern has been ameliorated by the
establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC).2 64  The
ICC has 121 members,2 65 which means that the majority of the
world's countries are now parties. At least in theory, then, the
majority of violations of international criminal law should now be
subject to adjudication before a permanent international court2 6 6
with an independent prosecutor.2 67 On its face, justice should be
less sporadic and dependent on politics than it was in the decades
before the ICC.
On the other hand, there are still concerns about selectivity and
the role of politics at the ICC. All of the ICC's investigation and
prosecutions have occurred in African countries. 268  There is a
264 See Rome Statute, supra note 217.
265 See Ratification of Rome Statute, COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, www.iccnow.org/?mod=reomeratifications (last visited Sept. 10, 2013).
266 See generally Rome Statute, supra note 217, art. I (establishing a permanent
international criminal court with jurisdiction over "the most serious crimes of
international concern").
267 See id. art. 15 (giving the Prosecutor the independent authority to initiate
investigations); id art. 42 (establishing an independent Office of the Prosecutor and
stating that members of the Office "shall not seek or act on instructions from any
external source").
268 At this time, the ICC has opened formal investigations into the situations in
Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur in Sudan, the Central African
Republic, Libya, C6te d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Mali. See I.C.C., Situations and Cases,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations
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feeling in Africa that the ICC's selectivity is being driven by
political considerations and anti-African bias.269 Still, we have
come a long way from the "victor's justice" of the IMT, with its
explicit exclusion of members of the Allied armed forces from the
court's jurisdiction.2 70
More troubling than the role of politics in the founding of the
ICTY is the evidence that decisions about whom to charge (and to
not charge) were driven in some cases by political considerations.
For example, commentators have noted that the Prosecutor
appeared to create an advisory committee regarding NATO actions
in Kosovo largely to provide cover for a decision not to investigate
seriously any potential crimes. It certainly seems undesirable for
powerful states to be able to pressure the Prosecutor into not
investigating potential crimes committed by their nationals.
Moreover, this problem is not limited to the ICTY. For example,
many commentators view the ICC Prosecutor's decision not to
initiate an investigation into alleged crimes committed on the
territory of Palestine as a largely political decision taken to avoid
antagonizing powerful opponents of the court.27 1 Similar
criticisms have been made about the Prosecutor of the ICTR.2 72
%20and%20cases.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2013) (listing current descriptions of current
and past cases).
269 See Charles Chernor Jalloh, Regionalizing International Criminal Law?, 9 INT'L
CRIM. L. REV. 445, 462-65 (2009) (providing quotes from prominent African leaders
claiming that the ICC unfairly pursues cases in Africa); Ifeonu Eberechi, "Rounding Up
the Usual Suspects: " Exclusion, Selectivity, and Impunity in the Enforcement of
International Criminal Justice and the African Union's Emerging Resistance, 4 AFRICAN
J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 51, 52 (2011) ("[T]his article argues that despite the establishment
of the ICC, the enforcement of international criminal justice has been selective, targeting
only 'uncivilized' nations.").
270 See IMT Charter, supra note 61, art. I (limiting jurisdiction to "major war
criminals of the European Axis").
271 See, e.g., John Cerone, Legal Implications of the UN General Assembly Vote to
Accord Palestine the Status of Observer State, 16 ASIL INSIGHTS 37, Dec. 7, 2012
(describing the Prosecutor as having "punt[ed]" on the question of whether to open an
investigation into alleged crimes committed in Palestine and expressing hope that the
Prosecutor's future practice on the issue would be guided by "legal analysis" rather than
"political choices").
272 See, e.g., SCHABAS, supra note 56, at 79 (noting that the ICTR has been
criticized for its failure to investigate crimes committed by members of the Rwandan
government, allegedly because of concerns that such investigations would cause the
Rwandan government to refuse to cooperate with the ICTR and thereby prevent it from
functioning).
108 Vol. XXXIX
FAIRNESS AND POLITICS AT THE ICTY
Just as troubling are the low conviction rates for ethnic
Bosniaks and Kosovar Albanians at the ICTY. There is some
evidence that the decision to prosecute members from these
groups was driven by a desire to indict non-Serbs as a way to
counter claims that the ICTY was biased against ethnic Serbs. If
true, the low conviction rates represent a breach of the
Prosecutor's duty to ensure that only solid cases be pursued and
highlight the danger of placing too much emphasis on political
considerations. This class of cases looks the most unfair of all the
cases at the ICTY, but not because these accused were more likely
to be convicted. Rather, these cases look unfair because some of
them arguably should not have been brought in the first place,
despite the fact that they often resulted in acquittals.
This Article's central conclusion is that ICTY trials were
predominantly legal, but that largely positive conclusion is
tempered by the finding that political considerations effected both
the establishment of the court and, more importantly, questions
about who to charge. Is it enough that the trials are fair if political
considerations adversely affect other aspects of the process? The
simplistic solution is to demand that the Prosecutor not succumb
to political considerations when deciding who to investigate and
charge. But how practical is that? Had the Prosecutor opened an
investigation into NATO forces and actually charged any NATO
personnel, it might well have led to the closing of the ICTY.273
Just as the purely legal trial is likely a platonic ideal,274 the
purely legal prosecutorial decision is also likely an ideal that
cannot be reached. Imagine a Prosecutor who is faced with the
unpalatable choice of: (1) investigating a small number of NATO
personnel for relatively minor (in the context of the atrocities
committed during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia) potential
crimes and risking the dissolution of the ICTY; or (2) declining to
investigate possible crimes by NATO and instead concentrating on
those responsible for the most serious crimes committed during
the conflict. It is hard to imagine a Prosecutor who, faced with
273 See id. at 77 ("Privately, many at the Tribunal said the Prosecutor had little
choice because the Security Council would have shut down the entire operation if even
serious consideration was given to prosecuting Americans, or other NATO nationals.").
274 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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this choice, would not forego the investigation of NATO.27 5
Framed this way, the decision is understandable, though also
overtly political.2 76
It appears axiomatic that states will try to influence the
decisions of international courts. Moreover, they will try to exert
influence at the earliest possible stage because trials against their
nationals are embarrassing, particularly where they implicitly
impugn the policies of the state. For example, any indictments
against NATO personnel at the ICTY would surely have been
viewed as an indictment more generally of the policies of those
states that intervened in Kosovo, even if technically indictments of
individuals. Thus, the states that founded the IMT simply
excluded their nationals from the court's jurisdiction. When that
option was unavailable at the ICTY, NATO states exerted pressure
to prevent the Prosecutor from opening a formal investigation. If
the Prosecutor had been able to resist political pressure and had
charged a national of a NATO state, then those states would likely
have continued to exert political pressure on the court during the
trials. In other words, the fact that the trials appear to have been
predominantly legal in nature may partly be a result of the
susceptibility of the Prosecutor to political pressures. In that
sense, consideration of political pressures at the investigation and
charging stages by the Prosecutor may help to insulate the trials
27from those same pressures. For example, the government of
Cambodia seems willing to permit basically fair trials at the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, but only if it
275 While Carla Del Ponte claims that she was not pressured by NATO to refrain
from investigating the bombing campaign, she argues in her memoir that it would have
been "impossible" for her to continue with a prosecution of NATO personnel "without
undermining the rest of the tribunal's work." See CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME
PROSECUTOR: CONFRONTATIONS WITH HUMANITY'S WORST CRIMINALS AND THE CULTURE
OF IMPUNITY 60-61 (Feltrinelli Ed. 2008). She appears to regret the decision but also
considers it the correct one under the circumstances. Id,
276 See Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-
Based Approach, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 225, 267-68 (2012) (arguing that the Prosecutor's
decision was "defensible" given the circumstances and the court's goals and limitations).
277 But see Marlise Simons, Hague Judge Faults Acquittals of Serb and Croat
Commanders, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/world/
europe/hague-judge-faults-acquittals-of-serb-and-croat-commanders.html?page
wanted=all&_r-0 (detailing allegations of attempts to influence judges at the ICTY for
political purposes).
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can control who is charged and brought to trial.278
This state of affairs is far from desirable, but seems to be
deeply embedded in the world. There have been attempts by states
to influence the work of just about every international criminal
court. 279 When high-profile international prosecutions will affect a
state's national interest, those states will try to exert pressure on
the court. First, they will try to prevent investigations from
occurring and charges from being brought. But if that fails, they
will probably continue to try to influence the trial proceedings.
Simply declaring that the prosecutors and judges are
independent 2 is not likely to change this result. States have too
many levers that can be used against international courts, which
are generally much weaker than states. Moreover, there is little
downside to trying to influence the court's work. States,
particularly powerful states, seem to pay little price internationally
for their attempted interference. In short, attempts by states to
influence the work of international courts are likely to remain a
feature of international criminal justice for the foreseeable future.
VII. Appendix: The Database
Unless otherwise noted, the statistics in this article come from
a database of ICTY cases created by the author. Initially,
information about the ICTY's cases was collected from the ICTY
website. For most of the ICTY's cases, it has produced what it
calls a "Case Information Sheet."28 ' These Case Information
Sheets contain summaries of the proceedings in each case. Each
Case Information Sheet was reviewed and the following
information entered into a database: case name, case number, case
nickname (if any), number of accused in case, the names of the
278 See Ford, supra note 4, at 450-51.
279 See supra notes 61, 63-70, 271-272, 278.
280 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 217, art. 42(1) ("The Office of the
Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the Court.").
281 See, e.g., Case Information Sheet for Radovan Karadii (IT-95-5/18), available
at http://icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/cis/en/cis karadzic en.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2013).
Case Information Sheets are not available for a number of cases where indictments were
issued, for instance where the accused died prior to transfer to the ICTY or where the
indictment was withdrawn prior to the arrest of the accused. For cases where an
Information Sheet was not available, the relevant information was extracted from the
indictment.
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accused, the ethnicity of the accused,28 2 the accused's year of birth,
at what stage of the proceedings the accused died (if death
occurred prior to completion of case), whether a guilty plea was
entered, the total number of trial days, the number of witnesses
presented by the prosecution, the number of witnesses presented
by the defense, the number of witnesses presented by the chamber,
the number of exhibits entered by the prosecution, the number of
exhibits entered by the defense, the number of exhibits entered by
the chamber, the number of lawyers listed for the prosecution, the
number of lawyers listed for the defense, whether the accused was
self-represented, whether there was a full trial,283 the trial sentence
(or acquittal), whether an appeal was made, the resulting sentence
following appeal, and the current status of the case. In addition,
information was added to the database about the lengths of the
final indictment28 4 and the first trial judgment.
Subsequently, all of the final indictments were read and then
coded for a number of variables, including: the accused's alleged
role or position within the political or military hierarchy, the total
number of counts, the number of war crimes counts, the number of
crimes against humanity counts, the number of genocide counts,
the modes of liability alleged against the accused, the number of
crime sites in the indictment, the extent of the crime sites, the
number of people alleged to have been killed, the number of
people alleged to have been wounded, the number of people
alleged to have been forcibly transported or deports, the number of
people alleged to have been unlawfully imprisoned, and the extent
of the destruction of physical property. The work of coding the
indictments was done by research assistants according to
282 This is not explicitly listed in the Case Information Sheets but can usually be
deduced from the affiliation of the accused with one of the sides to the conflict.
283 Guilty pleas were not treated as full trials even though they resulted in
judgments. In many cases, the "trials" were highly abbreviated and did not accurately
represent the evidence that the prosecution would have presented in an adversarial
proceeding.
284 While in most cases, the latest indictment in time was used because it
represented the most complete outline of the case the prosecution intended to present at
trial, the next to last indictments were used in cases that involved guilty pleas because of
the tendency to enter an amended indictment that removed many of the counts in the
previous indictments as part of a plea deal. Thus the final indictments in cases that
involved a plea deal often did not represent the case the prosecution would have
presented if the case had gone to trial.
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instructions contained in a codebook that is available upon request
from the author. The data was collected in an Excel spreadsheet
and then converted to a STATA database. Analysis was done in
STATA. The database contains information about the ICTY's
work up until May 03, 2012.

